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SILENCE AND THE SECOND WALL 
MING H. CHEN* AND ZACHARY NEW** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Trump administration has made its clarion call “build the wall.”1 
From the start of the presidential campaign to the government shutdown to 
the declaration of a national emergency, he has made the wall the centerpiece 
of his immigration enforcement strategy. Opposition to the first wall has been 
strong, ranging from street protests to the marbled halls of Congress. Indeed, 
as of this writing, President Trump vetoed the House and Senate joint 
resolutions to repudiate the White House declaration of a national emergency 
at the border, after an extended fight over appropriations. While public 
attention has been riveted on these dramatic episodes at the southern border 
of the U.S., many more subtle challenges to legal migration have been 
introduced and implemented. Collectively, these constitute a second wall. 
This second wall is invisible to the public eye and has garnered little attention 
from immigration advocates or policy reformers. To the extent advocates and 
reformers have even noticed, their strategies to suspend the second wall have 
been slight. This essay seeks to expose the features of the second wall, to 
explain the silence surrounding it, and to propose strategies for countering it. 
The second wall exists in several senses. First, the second wall blocks 
out legal immigrants, rather than the border crossers who contend with the 
first wall. The Trump administration’s most visible priorities have been 
Central American asylum-seekers who cross the U.S.-Mexico border without 
documentation. Restricting their entry entails a physical barrier. The second 
wall has a broader target and consists of more varied impediments. The 
second wall is constructed against legal immigrants. It impedes families 
seeking to unite, employers seeking to sponsor workers for their businesses, 
and refugees or military service members taking the next steps in their 
journey toward becoming citizens. The imposition of barriers includes 
procedural hurdles, such as intensified vetting and heightened scrutiny of 
petitions, more requests for evidence, and new interview requirements. Like 
the first wall barriers, these second wall barriers keep families apart, 
disadvantage noncitizen workers, and render vulnerable immigrants in need 
of humanitarian benefits. The second wall creates uncertainty in the 
                                                                                                                 
*. Associate Professor and Faculty-Director, Immigration Law and Policy Program at University 
of Colorado Law School. Thank you to the students and faculty at Colorado Law School and the C. 
Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State at the Antonin Scalia School of Law for 
valuable discussions of these ideas. Thank you to the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 
for the opportunity to share them. Special thanks to Jason Cade, Deb Cantrell, Emily Ryo, Shannon 
Gleeson, Ingrid Eagley, Sharon Jacobs, Huyen Pham, and Nina Rabin for their insights. 
**. Colorado Law, Class of 2019; President, Immigration Law and Policy Society. 
1. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the National Security and 
Humanitarian Crisis on our Southern Border, White House (Feb. 15, 2019), available at https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-national-security-humanitarian-
crisis-southern-border/. 
Chen Book Proof (Do Not Delete) 8/15/2019 5:39 PM 
550 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 28:549 
immigration process for those who have traditionally felt secure in the 
passage. 
Second, while the Trump administration’s aggressive immigration 
enforcement efforts center on building a wall at the U.S.-Mexico border, they 
now also follow legal immigrants into the interior and block their integration 
into American society. A variety of administrative practices govern 
immigrants in matters of settlement or the quotidian details of their daily 
lives—work, housing, schools, and social affairs—and constitute a more 
abstract form of a wall than the barriers to immigrating. Many of these 
policies are esoteric and may even seem mundane. However, once 
immigrants have crossed borders to arrive in the U.S., the Department of 
Homeland Security is limiting their ability to obtain green cards and to 
naturalize; some naturalized citizens cower in fear of denaturalization. In 
other words, the border mentality extends beyond initial entry to follow 
immigrants into the process of settlement.  
The bundle of changes to immigration policy manifests in the 
immigration bureaucracy. In particular, many of the agency practices and 
policies that we are calling the second wall have built a bureaucratic barrier 
that is hard to see, understand, and redress. The same is true for changes in 
other agencies of the immigration bureaucracy, whether in the immigration 
courts, where immigration judges can no longer grant continuances while 
applications for relief from removal trudge through the bureaucracy, or in 
ICE, where officers no longer exercise discretion in humanitarian cases that 
had been deprioritized under prior administrations. Collectively, these 
changed agency procedures and policies create intensifying procedures for 
immigration benefits and shifts in policy toward substantive goals that 
compete with the provision of immigrant services. The toll can be seen in 
unprecedented backlogs and long wait times. Evidence abounds that these 
policies are having an impact on many quarters of life inside the U.S.: the 
number of H-1B skilled worker petitions declined, international student 
enrollment is falling, tourism is down, and immigrants are choosing to stay 
away from the U.S. The “administration has adopted dozens of policies and 
procedures that are slowing, or even stopping legal immigration.”2 So while 
the border wall embodies a physical barrier, it can also be viewed as a social 
construction. Understanding the wall in this way transforms the border wall 
from being a tangible marker of divisions to being a symbol of 
bureaucratizing forces excluding legal immigrants.  
Opposition to the first border wall has been strident: from clamoring at 
the U.S.-Mexico border over mounting obstacles to Central American 
migrants seeking asylum, to street protests outside Congress and courthouses 
and churches over ICE raids, to hunger strikes in detention facilities over 
conditions of confinement. Cumulatively these strategies have created a 
sanctuary movement to protect undocumented immigrants from federal 
enforcement. Opposition to the second wall has been quiet by comparison. 
There has not been a broad public disapproval with the aims of second wall 
policies, nor the mobilization of a sanctuary movement that empowers local 
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communities to stand up for legal immigrants. Using institutional and policy 
analysis, the essay explores the distinctive challenges posed to legal 
migration by the second wall and the difficulty of countering them through 
traditional means of resistance. One complication with opposing the second 
wall is its invisibility or obscurity, which makes it difficult to fully 
comprehend the nature of the challenge or the reach of its consequences. 
Complexity makes it difficult to counter the policies. A lack of transparency 
makes it difficult to appeal to the institutions responsible for holding 
immigration policymakers accountable.  
Part I provides some background on legal migration and the immigration 
bureaucracy. Part II explains the characteristics of second wall policies and 
provides extensive examples. Part III turns to the emerging challenges to the 
second wall and analyzes their promise and deficits. Part IV concludes with 
suggestions on how to restore the federal government’s mission of serving 
immigrants and proposes a multi-pronged strategy for scaling the second 
wall. 
II. BACKGROUND ON LEGAL MIGRATION 
For the past 30 years, U.S. immigration policy has focused on federal 
enforcement against undocumented immigrants, so-called criminal aliens, 
and suspected foreign terrorists. Discussions of changes to legal migration 
have come up from time to time, but without comprehensive immigration 
reform from Congress there has been no real action to change the architecture 
of legal migration. The 1952 McCarren Walter Act is still the edifice of the 
modern framework of immigration law that includes employer-based, 
family-sponsored, diversity, and humanitarian visas as the vehicles for legal 
admissions. This is changing under the Trump Administration, whose 
immigration policy is so expansive that it has reached new targets and 
enlisted new actors.  
The federal government’s immigration apparatus is concentrated in the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a behemoth department 
forged after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that is comprised of 
88 units who claim responsibility for some aspect of national security.3 The 
enforcement components of the agency, the Immigration and Customs and 
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have been 
the vanguard of modern immigration policy. By comparison, the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) is small. USCIS is the 
immigrant-serving component of the federal immigration bureaucracy. 
Whereas ICE and CBP primarily contend with undocumented immigrants, 
USCIS handles most matters concerning legal immigrants: entry visas and 
immigration benefits for temporary visitors, asylum-seekers, and 
immigrants; green cards for employers, workers, and families seeking to 
unify; and naturalized citizenship for those who are eligible. The agency 
makes adjudicative decisions at service centers and manages all immigration 
benefit functions that do not relate to enforcement. It is separated from ICE 
and CBP by institutional design as a way to bolster agency independence and 
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improve customer service toward noncitizens. Yet ceasing to process these 
immigration benefits in a timely fashion and adopting new initiatives that 
cast a suspicious eye on legal migrants signals that changes at USCIS are 
central to understanding second wall policies. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY: FROM ENFORCEMENT TO 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES AND BACK 
Service to legal immigrants is not confined to USCIS. Other agencies 
involved in legal immigration include the State Department, U.S. 
Department of Labor, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. The State Department handles visa applications abroad and 
recommends levels of yearly refugee admissions. The Departments of Labor 
and Health and Human Services certify the fitness of immigrants for entry 
and that the terms of their entry will not pose an economic threat to American 
taxpayers and workers. Congress establishes ceilings for family-sponsored 
immigration and diversity visas. However, among the several agencies that 
are involved in immigration regulation, USCIS is the primary agency tasked 
with legal immigration and has gone through the most dramatic 
transformations in the implementation of its statutory mission.  
As a key component of the immigration bureaucracy responsible for 
legal migration, USCIS has over 200 offices around the world and employs 
roughly 19,000 employees.4 It is situated in the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, and it performs a variety of functions. It focuses 
especially on processing petitions and applications for immigrant benefits, 
including petitions related to three key points on the immigrant's journey 
towards civic integration: lawful entry on nonimmigrant or immigrant visas, 
adjusting between statuses, including from temporary to permanent resident 
status (LPR or green card), and naturalizing as a U.S. citizen. It also handles 
asylum and refugee claims, employment authorizations, services related to 
enforcement of immigration workplace laws, such as e-Verify for workplace 
authorization or SEVIS for certification of international students, and 
services related to immigrant integration, such as administration of the 
Immigrant Integration Grants Program and Citizenship Resource Center.5 
Prior to the creation of USCIS as an agency within the Department of 
Homeland Security, immigration benefits and enforcement were handled for 
70 years within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS 
operated as a unit within the U.S. Department of Justice from 1940-2003, 
and was concerned with stemming the flow of immigrants following the 
nation-building of the world wars. From 1933-1940, the U.S. Department of 
Labor also assisted in regulating immigration, and was primarily concerned 
with protecting American workers.6 Prior to 1933, there were separate 
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federal offices administering immigration matters, known as the Bureau of 
Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization respectively, and an emphasis 
on nation-building. The INS was established on June 10, 1933 to merge these 
previously separate areas of administration.7 As immigration waned and 
restriction increased following World War II, the consolidated services 
shifted their focus back toward enforcement. The result was a tension 
between enforcement and admission made more complicated by cross-
cutting laws governing immigrants’ rights and the shifting balance of power 
between the federal government’s headquarters and regional field offices. 
Negotiating these themes continued throughout the century. 
For example, there were several notable instances of agency functions 
changing to reflect the evolving relationship between immigration services 
and border control between 1930 and 1980. As Professor Deborah Kang 
notes in her history of the INS, the INS interacted with border patrol 
throughout its early history through an informal patchwork of policies and 
practices to balance enforcement with the entry and employment objectives 
of border communities. These interactions rendered the INS a policymaking 
body, not merely a law enforcement body. It initiated a process of negotiating 
immigrant services and enforcement that continues into more 
institutionalized forms today. A straightforward example arises in 1932, 
when Congress proposed to consolidate immigration service and border 
patrol by using repatriation instead of deportation at the border.8 A more 
complex example arose in 1944, when the Bracero Program changed border 
crossing protocols in a manner that reflected the federal agency’s struggle to 
balance the goals of enabling seasonal agricultural work, closing the U.S.-
Mexico border, and honoring good neighbor policies post-world war.9 While 
each of these incidents focused on the border, they are emblematic of broader 
challenges to balance immigration enforcement with immigrant services.  
Throughout the 1980-1990s period of expanded immigration 
enforcement, the INS came under intense criticism for organizational 
mismanagement. Though there were many factors, a good deal of the 
dysfunction resulted in part from the unresolved tensions between 
administering benefits and pursuing removal. The long-simmering tension 
boiled over in the scenario where an individual denied an immigration 
benefit—say an application for a green card—could be taken down the hall 
to the enforcement division that would begin removal proceedings. Or an 
undocumented parent might be reluctant to take a child who is eligible for 
an immigration benefit in for their scheduled immigration appointment, for 
fear of themselves being caught.10 
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/INS %20History/INSHistory.pdf.  
7. S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE: MAKING IMMIGRATION LAW ON THE US-MEXICO 
BORDER, 1917–1954, at 65–67 (2017). See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (abolishing the INS). 
8. KANG, supra note 7, at 66. 
9. Id. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (2010). 
10. See Nina Rabin, Searching for Humanitarian Discretion in Immigration Enforcement: 
Reflections on a Year as an Immigration Attorney in the Trump Era, MICH. J. L. REFORM (forthcoming 
2019); Interview with David Martin, former INS senior official and Emeritus Professor, University of 
Virginia Law School (July 6, 2016) (on file with author). 
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In the aftermath of September 11, these ruptures split apart the much-
maligned agency into separate enforcement divisions.11 A 9/11 Commission 
Report pointed out organizational problems that made possible the terrorist 
attacks. Key among these findings was that 15 of the 19 suspected terrorists 
entered on visas that could have been barred, if more stringently vetted 
beforehand.12 In the broad reorganization of immigration agencies and the 
creation of the DHS, these longstanding criticisms drove the separation of 
the two services into discrete agencies. In accordance with the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, enforcement split between CBP and ICE inside the 
DHS, as it also did between DHS and the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Executive Office of Immigration Review, Bureau of Immigration Appeals, 
and litigation offices. Within DHS, immigration benefits were consolidated 
away from enforcement functions—within USCIS.13 The restructuring 
reflected a worthwhile aspiration to separate enforcement and service 
functions, a principle that remains an aspirational goal even if it is not always 
carried out in practice. 
B. BALANCING ENFORCEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN THE MODERN 
IMMIGRATION BUREAUCRACY 
Once USCIS became an independent agency from ICE and CBP in 2003, 
its institutional weaknesses and limited capacity to pursue these objectives 
were revealed. It was the smallest and least funded of the agencies, with 95% 
of its budget coming from an Immigration Examination Fee Account that 
relied, and still relies, on fees paid directly by immigrant applicants to 
minimize the burden of immigration benefits on U.S. taxpayers, and only 5% 
from Congressional appropriations.14 It consistently ran into backlogs and 
suffered long processing times.15 Its processes and technologies were out of 
date. One insider called it the step-sister of the other immigration agencies. 
The irony of USCIS’s unusual funding structure, which is largely funded by 
user fees rather than an annual budget appropriation, is that it is less 
accountable to Congress.16 These known challenges—limited funding, high 
cost to individual immigrants, poor customer service, slow processes and 
outmoded technologies, and lack of accountability to Congress given its 
                                                                                                                 
11. KANG, supra note 7, at 168; LEMAY, supra note 5, at 68; LISA M. SEGHETTI, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL31388, INS: RESTRUCTURING PROPOSALS FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS 16 (2003).  
12. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 80–
82 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 
13. KANG, supra note 7, at 172–73. 
14. KANDEL, supra note 4, at 1, 7. While self-funding can be a source of insulation from political 
pressure in independent agencies, there is little evidence in the legislative history that agency 
independence was the reason for making USCIS self-funded. For a general discussion of the merits self-
funding, see Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1733 
(2013); cf. Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The 
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822 (2012) 
(discussing methods of congressional control over agencies through funding). 
15. Between FY 2002 and FY 2010, Congress called on USCIS to reduce its backlog and provided 
$570 million in direct appropriations for this purpose. The extent to which USCIS has successfully done 
so is contested. Administrative changes and national/world affairs affect the number of applications filed 
and that, in turn, affects the agency workload. That said, critics say that agency reclassifications of the 
definition of backlog obscure the need for change that is apparent regardless of fluctuations in caseload, 
e.g. the predictable rise before fee increases or presidential elections and less predictable responses to 
changes in immigration law. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV. OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2–3, 
11–12 (2007).  
16. Id. at 46–47; KANDEL, supra note 4, at Appendix A. 
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financial independence from the Congressional budget—have left the 
agency vulnerable in the face of intensified enforcement efforts in the two 
decades since its creation. 
Moreover, there are signs that a different balance is being struck between 
enforcement and service. Immigration enforcement is not a single-pronged 
goal in immigration policy. It occurs as one of several policy goals, including 
the administration of basic services and benefits to immigrants that facilitate 
their integration into American society. While integration and enforcement 
are typically treated to a functional division of labor, where the local 
government or nonprofit organizations are tasked with immigrant integration 
while the federal government takes on immigration enforcement, the two 
tasks are inextricably intertwined. The federal government retains 
responsibility for providing certain immigration benefits, most notably 
naturalization, in addition to ensuring fidelity to immigration law through its 
adjudicative functions. USCIS’ mission of providing service to immigrants 
is aligned with local community organizations involved in immigrant 
integration in important ways, such as by providing grants to local libraries 
engaged in citizenship-enhancing activities like classes on English and 
citizenship, or sponsoring naturalization drives and citizenship ceremonies. 
That is the integration side of the nexus. The enforcement side of the nexus 
has until recently been implicit, but it is ever-present: screening applications 
for immigration benefits, making adjudicative decisions about eligibility for 
asylum at the service centers, and adjudicating petitions for non-immigrant 
temporary workers. In the instances when an immigrant is deemed ineligible, 
the benefit is denied. Whether the matter ends there or whether USCIS 
reaches out to the enforcement minded components by issuing a Notice to 
Appear (NTA) in immigration court is a discretionary decision. Local 
sanctuary networks have pushed back against the federal government’s 
efforts to amplify immigration enforcement and promoted norms of 
inclusion and integration as a general matter, but far less around legal 
migration.17 
In addition, choices about the expenditure of resources and the 
prioritization of programs is significantly impacted by choices in executive 
enforcement discretion.18 The exercise of that discretion has shifted toward 
vigorous front-line officers and a more skeptical bureaucratic culture 
throughout DHS, including the USCIS.19 
C. CHANGING MISSION OF THE MODERN IMMIGRATION 
BUREAUCRACY 
Translating these norms of immigrant inclusion and integration into a 
national immigration policy requires restoring the balance between 
enforcement and integration. While enforcement and integration can be seen 
as opposites, they are linked: enforcement of immigration laws preserves a 
                                                                                                                 
17. Ming H. Chen, Sanctuary Networks and Integrative Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1361, 1384 (2019). 
18. For one of several articles about immigration enforcement discretion, see generally Zachary 
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014). 
19. Rabin, supra note 10, at 20–21 (describing heavy scrutiny, long delays, and low visibility 
denials as part of shift in USCIS bureaucratic culture). 
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space for legal immigration. Instead of enhancing integration at USCIS, there 
is evidence of enforcement undermining integration. The most vivid 
illustration of the need to shield federal integration is the Trump 
Administration’s literal rewriting of USCIS’ mission statement to say: 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation’s 
lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by 
efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits 
while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our 
values.20 
Notably the new statement reorders the priority of its functions to emphasize 
safeguarding the integrity of a lawful immigration system and securing the 
homeland, instead of administering immigration benefits as primary 
examples of how to honor nation’s values.21 The shifting priorities have led 
to reassignments of staff and duties to fraud and denaturalization, with 
consequences for the quality and quantity of benefits cases adjudicated. The 
mission also deletes language saying that the U.S. is a nation of immigrants, 
shifting the tenor of the agency toward fraudulent or otherwise unlawful 
immigration and elevating the defensive posture of USCIS that then Director 
Lee Francis Cissna has called a “sword and shield.”22 
In addition, USCIS has shifted its focus away from customer service and 
toward centralized administrative priorities. Help desk services for 
immigrants and their attorneys routinely yield stock replies. Calls go 
unreturned. Community stakeholder meetings are less frequent. While it has 
always been underfunded compared to its counterpart agencies in DHS, the 
agency has distinguished itself as being funded mostly through filing fees 
rather than Congressional appropriations. While this fee structure has the 
potential for strong accountability to the immigrants who seek out services, 
the cost to the immigrants is becoming quite high. Also, it appears that funds 
intended to be used for adjudicating immigrant benefits are being used to 
implement central administration goals. Examples include enhanced vetting 
procedures, staffing for enforcement operations within USCIS, and the 
initiation of new programs to tighten the link between naturalization and 
removal or between naturalization and denaturalization.23 While the use of 
                                                                                                                 
20. About Us: USCIS Mission Statement, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last updated Mar. 6, 2018). The former mission, statement read: “USCIS 
secures America's promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our 
customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding of 
citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration system.” Andrew R. Arthur, USCIS Changes 
Its Mission Statement, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Feb. 23, 2018) https://cis.org/Arthur/USCIS-
Changes-Its-Mission-Statement.  
21. News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Director L. Francis Cissna on 
New Agency Mission Statement (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-
director-l-francis-cissna-new-agency-mission-statement. 
22. Richard Gonzalez, America No Longer Nation of Immigrants, N.P.R. (Feb. 22, 2018, 6:18 
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/22/588097749/america-no-longer-a-nation-of-
immigrants-uscis-says. 
23. See generally AILA Policy Brief: New USCIS Notice to Appear Guidance, AM. IMMIGRATION 
LAWYERS ASS’N (July 17, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-policy-brief-new-uscis-notice-to-
appear [hereinafter AILA Policy Brief: New USCIS Notice]; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0050.1, UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND 
ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE 
ALIENS (June 28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-
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NTAs or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs) for benefit denials has been 
permitted previously, it was historically not frequently used. It was instead 
used infrequently only on occasions related to high priority cases.  
The recent exclusionary emphasis of USCIS, what public administration 
scholars have identified as “mission drift,”24 means that the offices handling 
legal immigrants have become an extension of the physical wall at the U.S.-
Mexico border. Granted, the mission of serving immigrants is not pursued to 
the exclusion of fidelity to immigration law. USCIS remains an agency with 
the Department of Homeland Security and several substantive provisions of 
the INA expressly seek to ensure compliance with immigration laws. As 
USCIS Director Cissna has said, “I just feel a strong commitment to the law, 
and to the rule of law . . . . None of the things that we’re doing . . . are guided 
by any kind of malevolent intent.”25 A similar rule of law justification for the 
more rigorous requirements associated with legal migration is given by 
USCIS Spokesman Michael Bars who says “Each year, immigration benefits 
are attainable for many law-abiding individuals legitimately seeking greater 
opportunity, prosperity, and security as newly entrusted members of society, 
and to this end USCIS takes great pride in helping these dreams become a 
reality . . . Ensuring that individuals who are subject to removal are placed 
in proceedings is fidelity to the law.”26  
Whatever their motivation, these accumulated changes in citizenship and 
immigration policy construct a second wall for immigrants at each stage of 
their efforts to settle into their lives in the U.S. New and highly technical 
procedures and policies have complex and sometimes insidious implications 
within arcane immigration law. Changes to agency practice have reduced 
transparency and hidden the impact of USCIS policies on legal immigration. 
Changes to substantive policy prioritize American economic and national 
security interests while harming vulnerable immigrant groups.  
                                                                                                                 
06-28-PM-602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf. USCIS issued a total 
of 91,711 NTAs in 2017 and 92,229 NTAs in 2016. Of those, 8 out of 10 were issued in cases where an 
asylum seeker obtained a positive credible fear determination after an interview with an asylum officer. 
In those cases, an NTA must be issued, under 8 CFR §208.30(f), to give the asylum seeker an opportunity 
to present his or her case to an immigration judge. In FY 2013, 2014, and 2015, USCIS issued 
approximately 56,000 NTAs each year. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., MONTHLY 
CREDIBLE AND REASONABLE FEAR NATIONALITY REPORTS (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ 
files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/FY18CFandRFstats_2018_06_30.pdf. 
24. As Margo Schlanger once said, being submerged in a broader agency dilutes the purpose. See 
generally Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014). Political scientist Marissa Golden has said that single-mission agencies tend 
to be more zealous than those with mixed missions. See generally MARISSA GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES 
BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2000). And that was the 
point: following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service 
was reformed to separate the benefit and enforcement functions, but it kept USCIS and ICE both within 
DHS where intra-agency cooperation is all too easy and principles of the internal separation of powers 
can be defeated. For more research on mission drift, see generally Alnoor Ebrahim et al., The Governance 
of Social Enterprises: Mission Drift and Accountability Challenges in Hybrid Organizations, 34 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 81 (2014); Marshall Jones, The Multiple Sources of Mission Drift, 36 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 299 (2007). Nina Rabin writes specifically about shifts in USCIS 
bureaucratic culture in Rabin, supra note 10.  
25. Ted Hesson, The Man Behind Trump’s Invisible Wall, POLITICO (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/09/20/uscis-director-lee-francis-cissna-profile-220141.  
26. Amanda Holpuch, Trump’s Invisible Wall: How His 2018 Immigration Policies Built a 
Barrier, GUARDIAN (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/25/trump-wall-
immigra tion-policies-mexico-border. 
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III. CASE STUDIES OF THE SECOND WALL 
This section sets out case studies of where administrative agencies pose 
barriers to legal migration—in effect, instituting a second wall or 
bureaucratic barrier to immigrants. As the case studies show, the bundle of 
policies and practices is consequential for the ability of immigrants to obtain 
lawful status and to integrate into American society. In addition, the policies 
become a construct that deters immigrants from trying and reifies the sense 
that they are outsiders even while living inside the U.S. Second wall policies 
fall into three major categories: those policies erecting new and burdensome 
procedural hurdles that massively increase the costs of legal migration, those 
changes in agency practice that have reduced transparency and obfuscated 
the impact that new agency policies have had on legal immigration, and new 
shifts in substantive priorities that result in changing policies favoring 
national security and merit based migration over long-established pathways. 
A. CREATION OF PROCEDURAL HURDLES TO LEGAL MIGRATION 
A variety of second wall policies have made it increasingly difficult for 
one applying for a legal immigration benefit to complete the process. New 
procedural hurdles concerning the handling of evidence, referral of 
immigrants to removal proceedings, calculation of unlawful presence, and 
refusal to give deference to prior adjudications impose costs on immigrants 
personally, financially, and temporally. 
One such policy relates to the way USCIS treats evidence submitted with 
petitions. During the summer of 2018, USCIS issued a new policy 
memorandum regarding when the agency will issue Requests for Evidence 
(RFEs) or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs) in cases where an adjudicator 
determines that an applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to 
establish eligibility for a benefit. Previous policy essentially held that unless 
there was an issue with statutory eligibility, an adjudicator would seek 
additional evidence from an applicant before denying a petition. The prior 
policy stated that an adjudicator should issue an RFE or NOID where 
evidence is insufficient to establish eligibility for relief sought unless there 
was “no possibility that additional information or explanation will cure the 
deficiency.”27 Under the new policy, “USCIS in its discretion may deny the 
benefit request for failure to establish eligibility based on lack of required 
initial evidence.”28 This new policy applies to all applications, petitions, and 
requests received after the effective date.29 This includes all green card and 
naturalization applications. This policy means that now some cases will be 
closed as a matter of course, without an opportunity for the applicant to 
correct minor mistakes. Even if the immigrant can refile, there will be added 
costs: over $1,000 in the case of an application for a green card, and 
increased delay. Compounding these evidentiary issues is a policy that 
                                                                                                                 
27. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., REQUESTS FOR EVIDENCE AND NOTICES OF 
INTENT TO DENY 2 (June 3, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/ 
2013/June%202013/Requests%20for%20Evidence%20%28Final%29.pdf. 
28. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0163, ISSUANCE 
OF CERTAIN RFES AND NOIDS; REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL (AFM) CHAPTER 10.5(A), 
CHAPTER 10.5(B) 3 (July 13, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/ 
AFM_10_Standards_for_RFEs_and_NOIDs_FINAL2.pdf.  
29. Id. 
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eliminates the prior practice of affording deference to prior adjudicatory 
decisions for purposes of extensions of nonimmigrant status.30 
Adding to this, in a policy memorandum issued June 28, 2018, USCIS 
was directed to begin issuing Notices to Appear (NTA), the charging 
document that initiates removal proceedings, in drastically more expansive 
scenarios.31 While USCIS is statutorily authorized to issue NTAs, policy has 
long been to prioritize agency resources on “cases that involve public safety 
threats, criminals, and aliens engaged in fraud.”32 As the former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service General Counsel Sam Bernsen explained, an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, that is, the choice not to initiate removal 
proceedings against an individual, is normally most appropriate “prior to the 
institution of proceedings . . . it makes little sense to put an alien through the 
ordeal and expense of a deportation proceeding when his actual removal will 
not be sought.”33 
Under the new policy, which USCIS has started to implement as of 
October 1, 2018,34 those circumstances warranting the initiation of removal 
proceedings have been greatly expanded, to include situations where, “upon 
the issuance of an unfavorable decision on an application, petition, or benefit 
request, the alien is not lawfully present in the United States.”35 This policy 
shift will greatly increase the risk an individual immigration benefit or green 
card applicant will experience, subjecting him or her to the possibility that, 
at the conclusion of their adjudication, the adjudicating officer will refer him 
or her to removal proceedings. Once an NTA has been issued, even if the 
individual then departs from the United States, USCIS will not have the 
ability to cancel the NTA.36 Withdrawing an application will not protect an 
applicant from the issuance of an NTA under this policy.37 Indeed, although 
USCIS states that it will generally not issue an NTA during a period in which 
an applicant may file an appeal or a motion to reopen or reconsider, it does 
                                                                                                                 
30. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0151, 
RESCISSION OF GUIDANCE REGARDING DEFERENCE TO PRIOR DETERMINATIONS OF ELIGIBILITY IN THE 
ADJUDICATION OF PETITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS 2 (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2017/2017-10-23Rescission-of-
Deference-PM6020151.pdf. 
31. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0050.1, 
UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN 
CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS 3 (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-0050.1-
Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf. 
32. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0050, REVISED 
GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES 
INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND REMOVABLE ALIENS 1 (Nov. 7, 2011) https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ 
default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/NTA%20PM%20%28Approved%20as
%20final%2011-7-11%29.pdf; see supra text accompanying note 23. 
33. Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, INS General Counsel, to the INS Commissioner, Legal 
Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion (July 15, 1976), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf. 
34. USCIS to Begin Implementing New Policy Memorandum on Notices to Appear, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-begin-implementing-
new-policy-memorandum-notices-appear (last updated Sept. 26, 2018). 
35. UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR 
(NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS, supra note 31.  
36. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS TELECONFERENCE OF NOTICE TO APPEAR 
(NTA) UPDATED POLICY GUIDANCE 4 (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/ 
nativedocuments/USCIS_Updated_Policy_Guidance_on_Notice_to_Appear_NTA.pdf. 
37. Id. 
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expressly reserve the option to issue an NTA before the filing of an appeal, 
and states that it may be required to coordinate with ICE to ensure ICE is 
aware of the favorable administrative action.38 This complicated and 
burdensome procedure is the result of USCIS having no jurisdiction over 
removal proceedings, and so once an NTA has been issued, what happens to 
the immigrant in removal proceedings is almost entirely out of the agency’s 
hands. According to the American Immigration Lawyers Association: 
The new NTA policy will also have a chilling effect on legal 
immigration in general, discouraging many people who are eligible for 
immigration benefits from applying out of fear they will be subject to 
unjustified enforcement. Thousands of individuals will face costly 
delays and severe consequences such as detention, forcible removable, 
and bars to returning to the United States for years. Moreover, this 
dramatic shift will divert finite USCIS resources away from its core 
mission of adjudicating immigration cases, resulting in even greater 
delays in processing that have plagued the agency for years.39 
While these new procedural changes facially increase the enforcement 
authority of USCIS to implement barriers to lawful immigration, other policy 
changes are more insidious. For instance, in the case of international 
students, a recent policy memorandum from USCIS has changed the way 
“unlawful presence” is calculated.40 As background, when individuals 
remain in the United States after the period of stay for which they were 
authorized, they begin to accrue what is known as “unlawful presence.” 
When they have accrued six months of unlawful presence, they become 
subject to a three-year bar to entering the United States.41 With one year of 
unlawful presence, that bar extends to ten years, with the potential of a 
permanent bar should they attempt to enter the United States while the bar is 
active.42 
This new policy subjects international students to the consequences of 
unlawful presence in circumstances where they may not know that they are 
unlawfully present. Where previously a judge or adjudicator would have to 
make a determination that the student had violated her status before unlawful 
presence began to accrue, the new policy begins counting unlawful presence 
starting the day after a status violation occurs. While facially this policy does 
not seem to be as forceful in its effect on lawful immigrants as the new RFE 
and NTA policies, the application of these new calculation procedures on 
international students is potentially life-changing. Under this new policy, a 
student who follows the advice of her designated advisor and takes below 
the required number of credit hours for a semester, one who works at her on 
campus job for 21 hours rather than 20 hours one week, one who babysits, 
or even one who volunteers her time for free at a job that would normally be 
                                                                                                                 
38. Id. at 9. 
39. See AILA Policy Brief: New USCIS Notice , supra note 23, at 1.. 
40. See U.S. Citizenship & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-1060.1, 
ACCRUAL OF UNLAWFUL PRESENCE AND F, J, AND M NONIMMIGRANTS 1–2 (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-08-09-PM-602-1060.1-
Accrual-of-Unlawful-Presence-and-F-J-and-M-Nonimmigrants.pdf. 
41. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). 
42. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). 
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compensated will legally become unlawfully present without her knowledge 
and without any interaction with a U.S. immigration official. Six months 
later that student will be subject to a mandatory three-year bar to entering the 
United States. That bar extends to ten years one year after the status violation. 
Any dependents of the student will similarly find themselves subject to harsh 
immigration penalties with no notice. 
Once these policy changes go into effect, the effective enforcement 
authority USCIS will have is immense. With the combination of policies 
allowing massive discretion to deny applications outright combined with the 
discretion to issue NTAs in massively expanded circumstances at USCIS’s 
disposal, an applicant who, for example, is attempting to adjust her status to 
lawful permanent resident and thus acquire her green card at the conclusion 
of her H-1B visa may have her application denied for insufficient initial 
evidence43 and be immediately placed in removal proceedings. All foreign 
nationals attempting to lawfully immigrate will face massive new procedural 
hurdles that did not exist just two years prior. 
B. CHANGES IN AGENCY PRACTICE THAT REDUCE TRANSPARENCY 
The second wall also manifests in new agency practices that obfuscate 
the way USCIS operates and how new policies affect the immigration laws 
in general. For example, a few changed agency practices reflect a concerning 
trend in USCIS towards becoming less transparent and less accessible. 
InfoPass, a self-scheduled, face-to-face meeting with USCIS officials meant 
to give applicants an opportunity to resolve issues in their cases and obtain 
information on their cases, is being phased out to encourage applicants to use 
only computerized systems.44 Whereas before an immigrant would be able 
to schedule a meeting with a USCIS official to ask questions about the status 
of her case or the reason behind a decision, this new system would 
completely phase out the personal, customer service focused procedure. 
Advisory work from the USCIS ombudsman has also completely ceased, 
with no new recommendations posted since December 2016.45 Similarly, 
with the ombudsman failing to adequately provide oversight to USCIS, 
investigations of complaints are not being handled with the requisite 
oversight. Implementation of new programs for estimating processing times 
lacks the transparency necessary to review agency conclusions and 
understand how it calculates estimated processing times.46 For many local 
chapters of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, USCIS Liaison 
Committees have been disbanded as well. Before these liaison committees 
served a symbiotic relationship between the private immigration bar and the 
                                                                                                                 
43. See Kavitha Surana, Authorities Can Now Deny Visa and Green Card Applications Without 
Giving Applicants a Chance to Fix Errors, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/authorities-can-now-deny-visa-and-green-card-applications-without-giving-applicants-a-chance-
to-fix-errors. 
44. News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS to Expand Information 
Services Modernization Program to Key Locations, https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-
expand-information-services-modernization-program-key-locations (last updated Oct. 30, 2018). 
45. USCIS Ombudsman, Recommendations by the Ombudsman, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
www.dhs.gov/recommendations (last published Nov. 9, 2017). 
46. How USCIS Estimates Application and Petition Processing Times, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL (July 18, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/uscis-data-application-
and-petition-processing-times. 
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government agency, allowing for the transmission of information between 
the attorneys and USCIS. Attorneys could voice concerns with new practices 
and obtain information directly from the agency. USCIS could use the 
immigration attorneys to disseminate information related to new policies and 
practices. Without this avenue for attorneys to speak with USCIS, only 
general USCIS stakeholder meetings are available.  
As a consequence of these and other new policies and adjudication 
procedures, historically large backlogs and processing delays in nearly every 
category of immigration benefit have developed, to the point that Congress 
and advocacy groups say they have reached “crisis levels.”47 While there 
does not appear to be a discreet policy decision to slow down the 
adjudication of benefits, the backlogs have been difficult for applicants to 
understand without USCIS communication to applicants about the progress 
of their adjudications. Freedom of Information Act requests filed by 
immigration advocates have not been fruitful, and lawsuits are currently 
pending to understand why and how such backlogs developed.48 Notably, the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)’s findings on the 
increased backlog include that there has been a surge in case processing 
times by 46% over the past two fiscal years and a 91% increase since fiscal 
year 2014.49 These processing delays have even increased as case receipt 
volume decreased in fiscal year 2018.50 These delays have led those seeking 
green cards or other benefits to be stuck in a legal limbo where they are 
vulnerable to the highly publicized increased enforcement initiatives of the 
Trump administration and being unable to utilize the many legal and social 
benefits that their immigration statuses would impart to them. 
C. SHIFTING SUBSTANTIVE POLICIES THAT PRIORITIZE NATIONAL 
SECURITY OVER IMMIGRANTS 
Shifting administrative priorities have additionally made it more difficult 
for individuals to obtain lawful status for which they would otherwise be 
entitled. Specifically, shifting priorities concerning national security and 
merit-based immigration are changing the landscape for many lawful 
immigrants seeking to navigate long-established immigration pathways. 
While the new administration can shift substantive priorities, the impact of 
these policies is harmful for immigrants, and some appear pretextual.  
1.  Intensifying Focus on National Security and Islamic Extremism.  
With little obfuscation, USCIS has been targeting specific groups, 
including Muslims suspected of terrorist associations, with intensified 
screening. For example, USCIS has previously implemented and continues 
to utilize a screening process known as the Controlled Application Review 
and Resolution Program (CARRP). CARRP is designed to “ensure[] that 
immigration benefits are not granted to individuals and organizations that 
                                                                                                                 
47. AILA Policy Brief: USCIS Processing Delays Have Reached Crisis Levels Under the Trump 
Administration, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N (Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter AILA Policy Brief: 
USCIS Processing Delays], https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-policy-brief-uscis-processing-delays. 
48. See e.g., Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. USCIS, 2:18-cv-08034 (C.D. Cal. filed 
Sept. 17, 2018). 
49. See AILA Policy Brief: USCIS Processing Delays, supra note 47, at 1.. 
50. Id. 
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pose a threat to national security. . . .”51 Because it uses overbroad criteria in 
making these national security determinations, it is primarily immigrants 
who are Muslim or are from Middle Eastern countries that are affected.52 
Individuals who are subject to additional scrutiny through CARRP will find 
themselves suffering from significant delays in adjudication, and almost 
certain denial.53 Indeed, even if an individual is not considered a “known or 
suspected terrorist” after additional screening under CARRP, USCIS officers 
are not permitted to approve the application without supervisory approval 
and concurrence from a senior level official.54 
Among the factors USCIS checks in determining whether individuals 
would be subject to CARRP are their employment, training, government 
affiliations, “other suspicious activities,” family members, and close 
associates.55 The “other suspicious activities” category covers behaviors 
ranging from criminal activities such as fraudulent document manufacture 
and smuggling or persons, drugs or funds, to large scale transfers or receipt 
of funds, to “[u]nusual travel patterns and travel through or residence in areas 
of known terrorist activity.”56 All immigrant and nonimmigrant visa 
applicants, as well as naturalization applicants, are subject to additional 
screening under CARRP.57 USCIS actively looks for reasons to deny a 
CARRP petition, including what would otherwise be minor omissions, 
including failing to disclose routine stops for secondary inspections at 
airports.58 
Other attempts at intensified vetting for Muslims have come in the form 
of electronic monitoring systems. One such system was the proposed Visa 
Lifecycle Vetting, an automated system that was to constantly monitor the 
social media of potential visitors to predict whether a migrant will be a 
“positively contributing member of society” and “contribute to national 
interests”; it is a $100 million system that was termed a “Muslim-ban by 
                                                                                                                 
51. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. ACAD., CARRP OFFICER TRAINING: NATIONAL 
SECURITY HANDOUTS, GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 2 (2009), 
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Guiance-for-Identifying-NS-
Concerns-USCIS-CARRP-Training-Mar.-2009.pdf; see Oversight of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Border Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (written testimony of Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Sers.). 
52. Yesenia Amaro, Little-Known Law Stops Some Muslims from Obtaining U.S. Citizenship, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/little-known-law-stops-some-
muslims-from-obtaining-us-citizenship. 
53. JENNIE PASQUARELLA, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., MUSLIMS NEED NOT APPLY: 
HOW USCIS MANDATES THE DISCRIMINATORY DELAY AND DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
BENEFITS TO ASPIRING AMERICANS 29, 30, 33–36 (2013), https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
MUSLIMS_NEED_NOT_APPLY_LCCR_ACLU_SoCal_Report.pdf.  
54. Id. at 36. 
55. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. ACAD., supra note 51, at 4–5, 
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Guiance-for-Identifying-NS-
Concerns-USCIS-CARRP-Training-Mar.-2009.pdf. 
56. Id. (emphasis added). 
57. See PASQUARELLA, supra note 53, at 26. 
58. See KATIE TRAVERSO & JENNIE PASQUARELLA, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., 
PRACTICE ADVISORY: USCIS’S CONTROLLED APPLICATION REVIEW AND RESOLUTION PROGRAM (Jan. 
3, 2017), https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/impact_litigation/2017 
_03Jan-ACLU-CARRP-advisory.pdf. 
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algorithm.”59 While in 2018, ICE abandoned the Visa Lifecycle Vetting 
program in the face of overwhelming public opposition,60 a different system 
was implemented, and indeed is still in use. 
In 2017, in furtherance of Executive Order 13780, the so-called “Travel 
Ban,” USCIS implemented a similar system known as “Continuous 
Immigration Vetting,” which began a process that constantly vets 
information from immigration benefit applications throughout the entire 
application period.61 The system operates by continuously vetting both 
immigrant and nonimmigrant applications and petitions up to the actual 
issuance of a naturalization certificate.62 Where procedural issues, costs, and 
public opposition caused the end of the Visa Lifecycle Vetting program, the 
Continuous Immigration Vetting System is still operational. These 
monitoring operations of such a politically unpopular group demonstrate the 
unrelenting fixation this administration has on national security. 
2.  Shifting National Security Priorities and the Military.  
Similarly, immigrants attempting to naturalize or obtain lawful status 
through military service have found themselves undergoing forms of 
intensified vetting justified on national security grounds that have either 
slowed down or completely eliminated these long-established pathways. 
Military service has long been a manner in which immigrants have sought 
their citizenship.63 Normally a much faster process then naturalizing through 
a civilian pathway, programs such as Naturalization at Basic Training have 
made the inducements to obtaining citizenship even greater and the process 
even faster, though some of these programs have come under criticism for 
not working as intended and are now being revisited. Additionally, those 
attempting to undertake a pathway to citizenship through the military have 
found themselves subject to more strict “intensive” vetting procedures. On 
October 13, 2017, the Department of Defense announced a change in its 
screening procedures for lawful permanent residents entering the military.64 
This change implemented increased security restrictions on both initial 
security screening, as well as for the issuance of certifications of honorable 
                                                                                                                 
59. Faiza Patel & Harsha Panduranga, DHS’ Constant Vetting Initiative: A Muslim-Ban by 
Algorithm, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/dhs-
constant-vetting-initiative-muslim-ban-algorithm. 
60. JAKE LAPERRUQUE, ICE Backs Down on “Extreme Vetting” Automated Social Media 
Scanning, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (May 23, 2018), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/05/ice-
backs-down-on-extreme-vetting-automated-social-media-scanning. 
61. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE CONTINUOUS 
IMMIGRATION VETTING (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pia-uscis-
fdnsciv-february2019_0.pdf. 
62. Id. 
63. There are two routes provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act that expedite and 
streamline naturalization for those in the armed services, as well as specialized programs for those who 
are entirely without status to acquire a pathway to citizenship. The peacetime route provided for in INA 
328, which has not been used since the Iraq War commenced, mirrors the refugee process post-refugee 
determination in many respects: servicemen become LPRs and may naturalize on a fast track. During 
periods of hostilities, defined in INA 329, and including the current period following the Iraq War, the 
citizenship pathway collapses the LPR and citizen phase such that servicemen can be immediately eligible 
for citizenship once they file an application with a fee waiver. 
64. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Policy Changes to Lawful Permanent 
Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program (Oct. 13, 
2017), https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1342317/dod-announ 
ces-policy-changes-to-lawful-permanent-residents-and-the-military-acc. 
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service that are required to obtain expedited naturalization through military 
service.65 Under this new policy, lawful permanent residents attempting to 
enter the military must fully complete a background investigation and 
receive a favorable military security suitability determination prior to 
beginning their service.66 By delaying the issuance of these certificates, this 
new policy effectively ends this method of naturalization, as the needed 
paperwork cannot be secured. Additionally, lawful permanent residents are 
further delayed from applying for their citizenship by 180 days if they are 
serving in active duty, or one year if serving in the reserve.67 As a side effect 
of the implementation of these increased vetting procedures, for a period of 
time, lawful permanent residents were completely barred from entering the 
Army Reserve, further delaying naturalization for these individuals.68  
For those immigrants who are completely without status, a specialized 
program known as the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest 
(MAVNI) program created a specialized pathway to citizenship for 
noncitizens possessing specialized skills helpful for military operations. 
Through this program, established in 2008 by President George W. Bush in 
order to give the U.S. military access to immigrants with vital medical or 
language skills, immigrants and nonimmigrants would be given a way to 
enlist in the military, and thus be given a pathway to citizenship that would 
not normally be available to them.69 After ten years, however, the U.S. Army 
has been discharging immigrant recruits and reservists who enlisted in the 
military with this “promised path to citizenship.”70 The future of this 
program has been called into question, and many individuals have been 
thrust into a legal limbo as a result.71 Many of these individuals were told 
their discharge was the result of being labeled “security risks because they 
have relatives abroad,” or that the Department of Defense had not completed 
background checks on them.72  
In addition to increased vetting for immigrants attempting to enter the 
military, and the functional ending of MAVNI, data suggests that those who 




68. See Ashley Edwards & Emily C. Singer, Exclusive: Army Reserve Bans Green Card Holders 
From Enlisting, a Move That May Break Federal Law, MIC (Oct. 17, 2017), https://mic.com/articles/ 
185297/exclusive-army-bans-green-card-holders-from-enlisting-a-move-that-may-break-federal-
law#.MdpEYaYT. 
69. See The MAVNI Program: Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest, CITIZENPATH 
(May 1, 2018), https://citizenpath.com/mavni-program. Of note, those citizens who eventually 
naturalized through the MAVNI program were also subject to additional bi-annual security check ins – a 
practice that a federal judge in Seattle enjoined as illegally discriminatory on January 31, 2019. See 
Lorelei Laird, Defense Department Engaged in Illegal Discrimination Against Some Soldiers, District 
Court Finds, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2019, 4:55 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/defense-
department-engaged-in-illegal-national-origin-discrimination-district-court-finds. 
70. Martha Mendoza & Garance Burke, US Army Begins Quietly Discharging Immigrant Recruits 
on Path to Citizenship, USA TODAY (July 5, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/ 
07/05/army-discharging-immigrants/762021002. 
71. See Tara Copp, Here’s the Bottom Line on the Future of MAVNI: Many Foreign-Born Recruits 
May Soon Be Out, MILITARY TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
military/2018/07/06/heres-the-bottom-line-on-the-future-of-mavni-many-foreign-born-recruits-may-
soon-be-out. 
72. Id. The Department of Defense assured in a prepared statement that “[a]ll service members . . 
. and those with an honorable discharge are protected from deportation.” However, the Associated Press 
reports that many of these individuals received an “uncharacterized discharge,” and so it is unclear if this 
protection will apply to them. 
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are attempting to naturalize through military service are facing increasingly 
high denial rates while adjudication rates are rapidly falling. During second 
quarter of fiscal year 2016, there were 2,409 applications for naturalization 
specifically through the military.73 Of those applications, 124 were denied, 
giving an overall denial rate of approximately 5.1%.74 Adjudication fell 
dramatically in fiscal year 2017, while denials increased. In the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2017 USCIS adjudicated 1,361 applications for 
naturalization specifically through the military, over 1,000 fewer than the 
year prior.75 Of these, 130 were denied, giving a denial rate of approximately 
9.5% - nearly double the rate at the same time the previous year. 76 Fiscal 
year 2018 has thus far shown even higher rates of denials, with adjudications 
falling far below even the 2017 average. In the first quarter of fiscal year 
2018, USCIS adjudicated only 946 applications to naturalize through the 
military.77 Of these, 191 were denied, giving an overall denial rate of 
approximately 20.2%.78 In the second quarter of fiscal year 2018, USCIS 
adjudicated only 496 applications for naturalization through the military.79 
Of those, 76 were denied, giving an ultimate denial rate of approximately 
15.3%.80 
3.  Diminishment of Refugee Admissions.  
A final shift in immigration policy that places a new emphasis on 
national security over legal immigrants is in the context of refugee 
admissions. The admission of refugees to the United States is authorized by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of 
1980. This mainstay of U.S. immigration has two basic purposes: to provide 
a uniform procedure for refugee admissions, and to authorize federal 
assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency.81 While 
legally authorized and, to many, morally appropriate, this humanitarian form 
of legal migration has also been under attack during the Trump 
                                                                                                                 
73. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF 
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND 




75. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF 
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND 




77. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF 
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND 




79. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF 
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND 




81. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf.  
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administration – beyond even that based on the so called “Travel Ban.”82 The 
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) was directed in September, 
2017 through a Presidential Determination that a maximum of 45,000 
refugees could be admitted in Fiscal Year 2018 – the lowest ceiling ever set.83 
Further, this historically low refugee ceiling was far from reached, with only 
19,899 refugees having been admitted as of August 31, 2018.84 This 
unexplained failure to even approach the refugee admissions ceiling for 
fiscal year 2018 has prompted a bipartisan group of 63 U.S. Representatives 
to send a letter to DHS Secretary Nielsen and DOS Secretary Pompeo in 
support of the USRAP and requesting an explanation for the decline in 
refugee admissions during FY 2018.85 The U.S. government has stated that 
the refugee ceiling will be further reduced to 30,000 maximum refugee 
admittances in Fiscal Year 2019.86 All this in the context of the largest 
refugee displacement crisis in recent history, with more than 5.6 million 
Syrians displaced as refugees, and where other countries are significantly 
ramping up their refugee admissions to accommodate this crisis.87 
D. SHIFTING SUBSTANTIVE POLICY PRIORITIES THAT EMPHASIZE 
MERIT-BASED MIGRATION 
In addition to a renewed emphasis on national security concerns, new 
immigration policies have started to prioritize immigrants of merit, contrary 
to the long-established emphasis that the United States immigration system 
has placed on family and humanitarian immigration.  
1.  Restrictions on Immigrants Likely to Become Public Charges.  
New rules meant to reduce the amount of public benefits utilized by 
immigrants and to curtail the immigration of those who would use them are 
one method the new administration has taken to narrow the type of 
immigrant that the United States will accept. As of September 24, 2018, the 
Trump administration is tightening restrictions on low-income immigrants 
by proposing a new rule expanding the scope of the “public charge” ground 
of inadmissibility.88 Legally, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any 
noncitizen who “in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of 
application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time 
of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to 
become a public charge is inadmissible [. . .] In determining whether an alien 
                                                                                                                 
82. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (March 6, 2017). 
83. Presidential Determination No. 2017-13, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,083 (Sept. 29, 2017). 
84. REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT (Aug. 31, 
2018).  
85. Letter Regarding Refugee Admissions from 63 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
to Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., & Mike Pompeo, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
(July 17, 2018), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-in-congress/congressional-updates/ 
house-members-qs-dhs-dos-re-refugee-admissiions. 
86. Lesley Wroughton, U.S. To Sharply Limit Refugee Flows to 30,000 in 2019, REUTERS (Sept. 
17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pompeo/u-s-to-sharply-limit-refugee-
flows-to-30000-in-2019-idUSKCN1LX2HS. 
87. Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts, FAQs, and How To Help, WORLD VISION (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts. 
88. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Proposed Change to Public Charge Ground of 
Inadmissibility (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/proposed-change-public-charge-
ground-inadmissibility. 
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is excludable under this paragraph, the consular officer of the Attorney 
General shall at minimum consider the alien’s (I) age; (II) health; (III) family 
status; (IV) assets, resources, and financial status; and (V) education and 
skills. . . .”89 This policy seeks to ensure that those who immigrate to the 
United States are self-sufficient, and will not become burdens to society. 
However, under this new approach to determining who qualifies as 
“likely to become a public charge,” an immigrant who utilizes food stamps, 
Medicaid, or housing assistance will find herself unable to sponsor relatives 
for admission to the United States, and, if she finds herself applying for a 
green card after using these benefits, she may be found ineligible as someone 
likely to become a “public charge.” 90  
Early studies on the proposed rule from leaked drafts in March 2018 
demonstrate that the number of potential noncitizens who could face a public 
charge determination would increase fifteen-fold.91 The study anticipates a 
massive “chilling effect” on immigrants’ use of health, nutrition, and social 
services, and anticipates that these effects are likely to expand beyond the 
immigrants themselves to the U.S. citizen children of immigrants.92 Indeed 
such chilling effects are already being reported despite the final rule not yet 
going into effect, with fearful immigrants declining food assistance and 
emergency Medicaid in anticipation that it may affect future immigration 
proceedings for themselves or their families.93 It is also not just noncitizens 
that are impacted by this changed rule – the rule does not differentiate 
between benefits sought for one’s own use and those sought for a U.S. citizen 
dependent, such as a child. In effect, the consequences of this policy are 
being pronounced to a large extent on children who ostensibly are not meant 
to be the target of the policy. 
2.  Restrictions on Temporary Workers.  
Similarly, under the guise of protecting American jobs and combatting 
fraud, new restrictionist policies have started to target temporary workers, 
specifically prioritizing those temporary workers who have the most 
academic or economic merit. Executive Order 13,788, better known by the 
title “Buy American and Hire American” was one such policy change that 
both directly and indirectly targeted temporary workers.94 Directly targeted 
were the high-skilled workers who fell under the H-1B visa category. The 
executive order explicitly tasked the Department of Homeland Security with 
implementing policies to ensure that the H-1B visas are awarded only “to the 
most-skilled or highest-paid petition beneficiaries.”95  
                                                                                                                 
89. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). 
90. See Tami Luhby & Tal Kopan, How Trump’s New Definition of ‘Public Charge’ Will Affect 
Immigrants, CNN (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/politics/immigration-public-
benefits/index.html. 
91. JEANNE BATALOVA ET AL., CHILLING EFFECTS: THE EXPECTED PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AND ITS 




93. Paul J. Fleming & William D. Lopez, Families Are Choosing Between Their Health and 
Staying Together, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 9, 2019), https://theconversation.com/families-are-choosing-
between-their-health-and-staying-together-108865. 
94. Exec. Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18,837 (Apr. 18, 2017). 
95. Id. at § 5(b). 
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In practice, when applying for an H-1B visa, employers have to show 
that they will be paying the “prevailing wage” for the job for which they will 
be employing an immigrant, as well as show that the individual they employ 
will be working in a “specialty occupation.”96 The archetypal H-1B worker 
works in the Information Technology field and is from either India or 
China,97 but with the new priority given to the “most skilled” and “highest 
paid” beneficiaries, the lower-level computer scientists and programmers are 
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain visas, or, if already in the United 
States, to continue their employment. Indeed, new policy memoranda from 
USCIS subjects those in the information technology field to more strict 
requirements than it once did.98 
As the “Buy American and Hire American” policy was implemented, H-
1B visas categorically became increasingly difficult to obtain, with data 
acquired by the National Foundation for American Policy showing an almost 
immediate increase in denials and Requests for Evidence from USCIS.99 As 
the report states, “the proportion of H-1B petitions denied for foreign-born 
professionals increased by 41% from the 3rd to the 4th quarter of FY 2017, 
rising from a denial rate of 15.9% in the 3rd quarter to 22.4% in the 4th 
quarter.”100 Similarly, “[t]he number of Requests for Evidence in the 4th 
quarter of FY 2017 almost equaled the total number issued by USCIS 
adjudicators for the first three quarters of FY 2017 combined.”101 
While increasing the denial rates for these visas, the administration also 
significantly slowed down the application processing by suspending the 
ability of employers to pay a premium fee for expedited adjudication – a 
process known as “premium processing.”102 The suspension was originally 
slated to last until September of 2018, but was extended to February of 
2019.103 While these slowdowns appear to add simple procedural hurdles to 
an H-1B applicant, in effect this change may deny a large number of 
                                                                                                                 
96. See 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h). 
97. Rani Molla, Workers from India and China Received 82 Percent of U.S. H-1B Visas Last Year, 
RECODE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/4/13/15281170/china-india-tech-h1b-visas. 
98. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0142, 
RESCISSION OF THE DECEMBER 22, 2000 “GUIDANCE MEMO ON H1B COMPUTER RELATED POSITIONS” 
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/PM-6002-0142-H-1B 
ComputerRelatedPositionsRecission.pdf. 
99. Stuart Anderson, New Evidence USCIS Policies Increased Denials of H-1B Visas, FORBES 
(July 25, 2018, 12:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/07/25/new-evidence-
uscis-policies-increased-denials-of-h-1b-visas/#7ff440f55a9f. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. Other forms of temporary worker visas have also been significantly burdened under the 
new administration. In Guam, from FY 2015 to FY 2016, H-2B visas for construction workers went from 
an approximately 100% approval rate to a 0% approval rate. A class action lawsuit was filed, and litigation 
is ongoing on the issue, but approval rates remain at approximately 0% for H-2B visas that do not fall 
within a specific military exemption, and the Pacific island has been without construction labor for nearly 
three years now in what is being called the “H-2B crisis.” See, e.g., Kevin Kerrigan, Delegate Seeks 
Solution to H-2B Crisis, GUAM DAILY POST (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.postguam.com/news/ 
local/delegate-seeks-solution-to-h--b-crisis/article_26fa19da-208a-11e9-b059-bb8d7764ec1e.html. 
102. News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Extends and Expands 
Suspension of Premium Processing for H-1B Petitions to Reduce Delays (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-extends-and-expands-suspension-premium-processing-h-1b-
petitions-reduce-delays. 
103. Id.; News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Resumes Premium 
Processing for H-1B Petitions Filed on or Before Dec. 21, 2018 (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-resumes-premium-processing-h-1b-petitions-filed-or-
dec-21-2018. 
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petitions, as the number of visas that may be issued is capped, and that cap 
is reached within one week of the application opening every year.104 Most 
affected by this delay are those workers who are already in the United States 
and need to travel internationally, as travel while an H-1B change of status 
request is pending will cause the petition to be considered abandoned by 
USCIS, leaving many high skilled workers essentially trapped as they wait 
for an adjudication burdened by significant processing delays.105  
Other barriers to the high-skilled worker category simply create 
additional cost and hassle for those attempting to acquire an H-1B visa, or 
those trying to employ H-1B visa holders. New policies now target 
employers with high numbers of H-1B workers or those who contract out H-
1B workers with on-site visits.106 These visits are a part of a larger initiative 
by USCIS to identify and target fraud and abuse within the H-1B system as 
a whole.107 Efforts to grant the visa to only the “highest paid” and “most 
skilled” beneficiaries are undercutting the business model for large numbers 
of companies who traditionally import temporary workers. Additionally, as 
the spike in Requests for Evidence demonstrates, the effort and expense of 
gathering documents and relevant evidence has greatly increased under these 
new policies. 
3.  Proposals to Curtail Chain Migration and Diversity Visas.  
In perhaps the clearest example of the new administration’s shifting 
policy priorities to favor merit-based immigration, there has been a large 
push to completely do away with one of the central tenants of U.S. 
immigration – that of family sponsorship. Derisively branded “chain-
migration,” family sponsored immigration has been the basis of the U.S. 
immigration system since the mid-20th century. Under proposed legislation, 
however, this policy would be curtailed or eliminated in favor of a point-
based system that prioritizes high-paid, young, and male applicants.108 Such 
a drastic change in the U.S. immigration system would completely remove 
avenues of immigration for such people as elderly parents, siblings, or adult 
children of U.S. citizens.  
Similarly, the administration has a stated interest in ending the diversity 
visa program, which has been used since the 1990s to allow for immigrants 
from countries with low immigration rates to receive green cards and enter 
                                                                                                                 
104. News Alert, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Completes the H-1B Cap Random 
Selection Process for FY 2019 (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-completes-h-1b-
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106. News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Putting American Workers First: 
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SERVS., (July 23, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty 
-occupations-and-fashion-models/combating-fraud-and-abuse-h-1b-visa-program. 
108. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE RAISE ACT: WHAT LIES BENEATH THE PROPOSED POINTS 
SYSTEM? 4 (Aug. 11, 2017),  
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the United States.109 Citing concerns that those seeking the diversity visa 
were the people that foreign countries “don’t want,” the President has made 
it clear that he seeks either the diminishment or complete removal of the 
program in any immigration reform deal.110  
The effect of these proposals would be to do away with the emphasis that 
the U.S. has historically placed on diversity in immigration. Similarly it 
would end the long-term emphasis that the U.S. has placed on family. 
Instead, the new policies would place more weight on economic priorities to 
the exclusion of all other factors.  
IV. SECOND WALL BARRIERS 
Resistance to the excesses of immigration enforcement at the first wall 
has taken the form of a sanctuary movement. The meaning of sanctuary has 
evolved in different contexts.111 As a historical matter, sanctuary referred to 
a church-based movement of shielding Central American asylum-seekers in 
the 1980s.112 During the Obama administration, sanctuary referred to local 
policies resisting the enforcement actions against so-called criminal aliens 
such as the transfer of immigrants from jails to ICE detention facilities on 
the completion of their criminal sentences.113 The Trump Executive Order on 
interior enforcement identified sanctuary policies as a range of local policies 
pledging to not cooperate with federal immigration enforcement.114 These 
sanctuary policies have become lightning rods for high-visibility litigation 
in federal courts. They have also served as the organizing principle for a 
loose network of institutions that seeks to protect a wide range of vulnerable 
immigrants, whether in churches, campuses, or corporations.115 The specific 
goals of the networked resistance ranges from refusing to disclose sensitive 
information about at-risk immigrants to providing them with safe and 
                                                                                                                 
109. Kaitlyn Schallhorn, What Is the Diversity Visa Program and Why Does Trump Want to End 
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111. Rose Cuison Villazor, What is A Sanctuary? 61 SMU L. REV. 133 (2008). 
112. See ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN 
COLLISION 62 (1988) (discussing the biblical roots of sanctuary); Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: 
Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 928–31 (1995) 
(examining the biblical foundations of sanctuaries); Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an 
Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 
747, 749–51 (1986) (noting that the concept of sanctuary may be found in several passages of the Bible); 
Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury – A Government’s Weapon Against the 
Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 38–48 (1986) (providing a brief historical discussion of 
sanctuaries). See also HILARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND CAESAR AT THE RIO GRANDE: SANCTUARY AND 
THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 25 (1995). 
113. See Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1197 (2016); Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 
1703 (2018). 
114. See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,801 (Jan. 25, 
2017) (defining sanctuary jurisdictions as those that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”). 
See also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 519–21 (N.D. Cal. 2017), reconsideration 
denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (defining sanctuary jurisdictions as those 
encompassing jurisdictions that have “a policy or practice that hinders the enforcement of Federal law . . 
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115. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 1209 (2018).  
Chen Book Proof (Do Not Delete) 8/15/2019 5:39 PM 
572 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 28:549 
affirming spaces.116 They have extended the momentum and reach of the 
sanctuary movement as an organized effort to protect immigrants.  
These first wall instances of sanctuary networks serve as a baseline for 
assessing where second wall strategies fall short. Litigation against second 
wall policies tend to be individual actions with case-by-case impact, low 
visibility, and limited prospects for setting precedent in federal courts. 
Political action opposing second wall policies is scant, with few media 
headlines attracting public attention or escalating political pressure. Outside 
of mainstream institutions and establishment politics, mass protest to the 
second wall policies is virtually nonexistent. While there are emerging 
efforts to counter attacks on legal migration, the opposition to the second 
wall pales in comparison to mass protests and calls to abolish ICE, cease 
family separation, or rescind the travel ban. This quiescence toward the 
second wall is proof of how it’s far reaching consequences are not 
understood as a systematic assault on legal immigrants.  
In the context of the second wall, building a more effective strategy of 
opposition requires building on individual litigation to activate broader 
political pressure and more coordinated legal action. Part III highlighted 
examples of second wall opposition. It analyzes them for their promise and 
pitfalls, finding as obstacles the invisibility, complexity, and competing 
policy justifications that underlie shifting priorities in immigration policy. 
Overcoming these obstacles requires scaling the second wall. 
A. LIMITATIONS TO DIRECT REPRESENTATION 
As recounted in Part II, the primary source of resistance to the second 
wall has been through litigating individual case-by-case challenges. The 
Transaction Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data gathering, data 
research, and data distribution service that provides information about public 
institutions, at Syracuse University, has issued data noting a massive increase 
in federal litigation surrounding denials and delays of naturalization 
applications.117 Specifically, as of December 2018, TRAC found a 26% 
increase in federal litigation from six months prior, a 29% increase from one 
year prior, and a 66% increase from five years prior.118 Increasingly, these 
suits are mandamus actions meant to compel USCIS to make a decision on 
an application—a direct result of a backlog that has many immigrants 
waiting for many months or years for final decisions. DHS also saw record 
numbers of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests in 2017, attributed 
to the new policies coming out of the agencies, and similarly saw a spike in 
the amount of appeals and litigation surrounding these disclosures.119 
Yet other major litigation is the result of employers or those seeking 
employment-based visas feeling the economic effects of tightening legal 
immigration policies. Information Technology companies have challenged a 
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new policy from USCIS allowing for significantly limited visa duration for 
high-tech workers.120 Construction companies based in Guam are in the 
midst of a class-action lawsuit alleging a new, unpublished policy from 
USCIS has caused approval rates for temporary work visas to plummet from 
nearly 100% to nearly 0% in less than one year.121 Foreign nationals seeking 
investment based EB-5 visas have also filed a class-action lawsuit over the 
substantial delays and backlogs in the program, alleging that the U.S. 
government has been miscounting the limited annual supply of visas.122 
Universities organized in opposition to a recent change in policy from USCIS 
related to how unlawful presence is calculated for international students, 
utilizing both the public comment process and litigation to voice their 
opposition.123 Faith-based organizations have made a resurgence in recent 
years, with many organizing in opposition to such policies as the public 
charge rule.124 Such organizations have been central to challenging laws 
meant to end “chain migration.”125 In response to discharges of immigrant 
recruits, increased scrutiny of noncitizens upon enlistment, and the 
deportations of veterans, veterans groups have also drastically increased their 
efforts in advocating for immigrants’ rights.126  
This eclectic array of groups bringing case-by-case challenges has had 
mixed success. As Nina Rabin notes, these types of challenges have been 
effective tools to fight back against the Trump Administration’s enforcement 
onslaught, and they have achieved individual success on a case-by-case 
basis.127 Accumulating individual successes, however, does not by itself add 
up to a systematic challenge. Some of the reasons the individual litigation 
has not enlarged into collective action are intuitive. Many of the challenger 
groups are new to immigration politics, having not often been central figures 
in prior debates regarding immigration. This may be one reason why 
litigation against second wall policies has been so issue-specific. The 
challengers may not be as plugged into well-established issue networks and 
there may be more start-up costs to mobilizing on any given issue. As a 
result, these challengers act in relatively uncoordinated ways. For example, 
in challenging the tightening restrictions on use of public benefits as a result 
of the new public charge rule, large-scale healthcare organizations, such as 
the American Medical Association and American Academy of Pediatrics, 
organized physicians in opposition to the rule, and further attempted to 
recruit the physicians in their organizations in submitting public 
                                                                                                                 
120. See ITServe All., Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 1:18-CV-02350 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 11, 2018). 
121. See Guam Contractors Ass’n, v. Sessions, 1:16-CV-00075 (D. Gu. Oct. 4, 2016). 
122. See Wang v. Pompeo, 1:18-CV-01732 (D.D.C. July 25, 2018). 
123. Complaint, Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18-891 (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1094000/1094960/https-ecf-ncmd-uscourts-gov-doc1-
13312981437.pdf. 
124. Interfaith Immigration Coalition Members Denounce Proposed Changes to Public Charge 
Definition, INTERFAITH IMMIGR. COALITION (Sept. 23, 2018), http://www.interfaithimmigration.org/ 
2018/09/23/interfaith-immigration-coalition-members-denounce-proposed-changes-to-public-charge-
rule/. 
125. Maria Benevento, ‘Chain Migration’ Misrepresents Reality, Say Catholic Advocates, NAT’L 
CATH. REPORTER (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/justice/chain-migration-
misrepresents-reality-say-catholic-advocates. 
126. Anna Núñez, We Should Better Serve Immigrant Vets, Protect Them from Deportation, AM.’S 
VOICE (Feb. 22, 2018), https://americasvoice.org/blog/tcrp-report-veterans/. 
127. Rabin, supra note 10. 
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comments.128 Disability rights organizations also came together in 
opposition to the rule, organizing comment campaigns against the new 
policy that they described as a “dangerous Catch-22 for the disability 
community.”129 Gay rights groups fearful of AIDS elimination have 
mobilized as well.130 Rather than forging a broad coalition, however, these 
health groups have fought in isolation to traditional immigrants’ rights 
groups. 
B. LIMITATIONS TO STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
Other reasons that the extant challenges to second wall policies have not 
generated broad public pressure, despite their individual successes, come to 
light by considering the features of the second wall that make the ingredients 
of a social movement elusive: the second wall is hard to understand because 
of its invisibility and complexity, it is hard to redress because of the lack of 
political accountability and judicial reviewability, and it is hard to dispute 
because of the possibly pretextual policy justifications offered in their 
defense.  
1.  Invisibility.  
One of the reasons that resistance is more scant is that the second wall is 
harder to see than the first. The second wall policies arise within countless 
individual acts of discretion. Individual immigrants and their advocates see 
their cases delayed or denied without realizing the broader patterns taking 
hold. Those caught within the backlog may not even be informed that 
anything is amiss given the reduced transparency of agency practices. As a 
result, the issues are perceived singularly, one issue at a time, rather than as 
part of a broader trend or pattern in enforcement. Without being able to 
connect the dots, negatively impacted groups do not comprehend the scope 
or character of the shifting policies. For example, the package of more 
burdensome procedures for obtaining immigration benefits has not 
surprisingly contributed to slower processing times and a backlog of 
adjudications in nearly every category of immigration benefit. Most of the 
time, these individual defeats do not catalyze coordinated action.131  
Interest in the backlog has been focused in national immigrant advocacy 
groups such as the National Partnership for New Americans (NPNA) and the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA). NPNA and AILA have 
                                                                                                                 
128. Oppose Harmful Changes to the “Public Charge Rules” Which Could Deter Millions of Legal 
Immigrants from Seeking Health Care, MASS. MED. SOC’Y (Nov. 26, 2018), 
http://www.massmed.org/Advocacy/Federal-Advocacy/Oppose-harmful-changes-to-the-
%E2%80%9CPublic-Charge-Rules%E2%80%9D-which-could-deter-millions-of-legal-immigrants-
from-seeking-health-care/; Ethics Talk: Commenting on the “Public Charge” and How to Respond to 
Federal Policy Change Proposals that Will Affect Patients’ Health, AMA J. ETHICS (Nov. 2018), 
https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/podcast/ethics-talk-commenting-public-charge-and-how-respond-
federal-policy-change-proposals-will-affect. 
129. Rebecca Cokley & Hannah Leibson, Trump’s Public-Charge Rule Would Threaten Disabled 
Immigrants’ Health and Safety, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/disability/news/2018/08/08/454537/trumps-public-charge-
rule-threaten-disabled-immigrants-health-safety/. 
130. See Linda Tam & Theo Cuison, Immigration Law, in AIDS AND THE LAW (Scott Skinner-
Thompson ed., 2019).  
131. Rabin, supra note 10 at 24 (describing the case-by-case strategy as a fight that feels 
“Sisyphean,” yet plays a crucial role in pushing back against these insidious enforcement trends). 
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worked hard to collect information about the size and growth of the backlogs 
in immigration benefits. In one of its campaigns, NPNA enlisted 50 mayors 
and county officials to press USCIS Director Lee Francis Cissna for 
explanations for the backlog through a Freedom of Information Act Request 
(FOIA).132 They followed up by filing a lawsuit to compel USCIS to disclose 
information about its naturalization backlog on Citizenship Day. Lawyers in 
subsequent lawsuits have kept up this pressure and urged that delayed cases 
be addressed.133 AILA broadcast the results of NPNA’s reports and 
independent research conducted by TRAC. It took its findings to Congress, 
urging Congressional oversight over USCIS. Together these groups are 
mounting a challenge to the procedural delays and growing backlog by 
highlighting the absence of information as the problem and by providing a 
narrative frame for illustrating the consequences of the institutional failures 
for immigrants’ civil and future voting rights. The information gathering and 
the publicity about the lack of transparency helps to frame the consequences 
of changing policies as a collective action problem, though the success of the 
strategy will turn on whether it garners attention and generates responses 
from policymakers.134 
2.  Complexity 
Another barrier that makes the second wall harder to understand than the 
first wall is that many of the second wall policies are highly technical. Many 
involve obscure agency procedures. The updated guidelines for requesting 
additional evidence, calculating unlawful presence, or declining to defer to 
prior adjudications, for example, are highly technical, and it is not obvious 
how they are related to one another. Nor is it obvious how they relate to the 
increasing backlogs on the adjudication of immigration benefits. Increased 
backlogs may instead be easily dismissed as procedural defects of a poorly 
operating bureaucracy rather than understood as a deliberate policy strategy. 
The combination of poor visibility and poor comprehension impedes social 
movement mobilization.135 
That is not to say that these policies have altogether evaded notice. 
Recognizing the “massive reconfiguration of the immigration laws relating 
to higher education,” several colleges and universities sued USCIS over its 
new unlawful presence policy on October 23, 2018.136 The new policies 
                                                                                                                 
132. Letter from U.S. Mayors to Lee Francis Cissna, Dir., USCIS (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/us-mayors-uscis-backlog-citizenship-applications (addressing the consistent 
backlog of citizenship application before USCIS). 
133. See Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 2:18-
cv-08034 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 17, 2018). 
134. The literature on law and social movements articulates the importance of collective action 
frames and framing processes as critical dynamics for the course of a social movement. Visibility is a 
prerequisite to strategic framing. For a summary of the framing literature, see Robert D. Benford & David 
A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 
611 (2000). 
135. The translation of individual disputes into collective action problems or legally actionable 
issues is the essence of framing processes that is described in the law and social movements literature and 
the legal mobilization literature. See Benford & Snow, supra note 134; see also William L.F. Felstiner et 
al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 631 (1980).  
136. Complaint at 2, Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18-891 (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1094000/1094960/https-ecf-ncmd-uscourts-gov-doc1-
13312981437.pdf. 
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enhance the consequences of an international student falling out of 
compliance with statutory requirements on the basis of a complex calculation 
of time that departs from prior policy and common sense. The suit is still in 
its nascent stages. So far the universities have obtained a temporary 
restraining order blocking the application of the new policy precisely 
because the impact of the policy is hard to understand.137 Central to the 
court’s decision to grant this injunction was the court’s own confusion as to 
when and if the new policy would apply to the plaintiffs, citing a “lack of 
clarity” in the policy’s application that may pave the way for finding the 
policy “arbitrary and capricious.”138 Presumably such confusion on the part 
of legal experts would carry over to international students trying in good faith 
to remain in compliance with their visa requirements. Larger movements in 
opposition to the unlawful presence policies are notably lacking, but expert 
driven litigation remains the primary opposition to complex second wall 
policies. 
3.  Lack of Accountability.  
Additionally, many of the USCIS agency practices change through 
administrative channels that escape public attention, political oversight, and 
judicial review because of the discretionary nature of the decisions. Agencies 
are still subject to Congressional oversight and elicit some public scrutiny 
when making changes under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as 
seen in the proposed rule to redefine public charge. Typically, the APA 
requires that changes to policy that have significant practical effects must be 
subject to public review through an administrative hearing before they go 
into effect, in order to grant affected parties notice and an opportunity to 
challenge the rule.  
In addition, Congress has done little to engage USCIS policy changes 
because there is little political pay-off for doing so. They have largely been 
beholden to, quiescent about, or distracted by the GOP and President’s calls 
for more restrictions rather than seeking to preserve pathways to admission 
or integration for legal immigrants. These second wall policies may not 
appear on their radar because of insufficient monitoring and signaling of fire 
alarms by nonprofit groups or because members score fewer political points 
for addressing them than they do for addressing the “first wall.” Or even if 
they are on the radar, the rules remain too technical to explain to the public 
and seem low stakes given that the USCIS is not subject to ongoing 
monitoring through appropriations as a user-funded agency. Once the 
political control of the House of Representatives shifted in early 2019, signs 
of increasing oversight from Congress over USCIS emerged, though the 
immigration debate remains primarily centered around border issues. 
Specifically, Congress has sent letters to the Ombudsman of USCIS detailing 
concerns with derelictions of the statutory duty to serve immigrants, 
especially in light of the director’s former employment as the executive 
director of the restrictionist organization the Federation for American 
                                                                                                                 
137. Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18CV891 (M.D.N.C. 2019), http://www.nafsa.org/_ 
/file/_/amresource/guilfordorders20190503.pdf. 
138. Order, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18-891, at 3 
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2019) 
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Immigration Reform (FAIR).139 Additionally, eighty-five House Democrats 
sent a letter to the director of USCIS raising concerns about the growing 
backlog in immigration benefits.140 
Courts are limited in their review of these individual decisions and 
agency policies after years of jurisdiction stripping.141 The limited judicial 
review for courts builds on a long tradition of deference to the political 
branches and enforcement discretion in immigration, both plenary power 
from the early days of immigration enforcement and more recently executive 
enforcement discretion widely used under President Obama and President 
Trump.142 To Congress and federal courts, it is not only unclear what the 
impact of changes in procedures will be, but the available avenues for 
evaluating the procedural changes is also limited. This creates a classic 
problem for public law scholars acquainted with the dilemmas of political 
control of agencies.143 
4.  Competing Policy Justifications.  
Finally, many of the second wall policies seem justified as needed 
protections or fixes for a broken immigration system. Specific immigrant 
subgroups representing Arab Americans and Muslims have been sensitive to 
worries that their members are unduly subjected to extra screening, longer 
delays, and higher denials through programs like CARRP, under the guise of 
posing national security risks.144 Civil rights groups raise worries that 
                                                                                                                 
139. Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform to Julie 
Kirchner, Ombudsman, USCIS (Feb. 6, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight. 
house.gov/files/documents/2019-02-06.EEC%20to%20Kirchner%20re.%20CIS%20Ombudsman.pdf. 
140. Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Members to Francis Cissna, Dir., 
USCIS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-in-congress/congressional-
updates/us-representatives-demand-accountability-uscis. 
141. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act, and REAL ID Act are examples of jurisdiction stripping in immigration 
law. For the harmful effects of jurisdiction stripping on immigration law, see Daniel Kanstroom, The 
Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the ‘Rule’ of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. 
L. REV. 16 (2006). 
142. Classic articles on plenary power in immigration law include Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More 
Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L. Q. 925 (1995) 
and Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Power Congressional Power, 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 255 (1984). 
143. The public law scholarship on this issue includes classic essays from political scientists such 
as Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast to legal scholars Peter Strauss, Peter Shane, 
Elena Kagan, Gillian Metzger, Eloise Pasachoff, and many others. For a select few articles that mention 
immigration as an example, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) (discussing INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 
(1983)); Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031 (2013) (discussing 
DACA); Ming H. Chen, Administrator-In-Chief: President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 347 (2017) (discussing DACA, Secure Communities, and Operation in Border 
Guardian). 
144. The Arab American Institute lists the Muslim ban, calls for extreme vetting policies, cutbacks 
on the refugee resettlement programs, the revival of the post-9/11 National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration system, and massive backlogs along the pathway to citizenship for high-skilled workers and 
family-sponsored immigrants alike among its chief concerns: “From calling for ‘extreme vetting’ to 
include ideological purity tests for incoming immigrants to specifically questioning immigrants regarding 
their religious views, and regularly calling for the suspension of the U.S. refugee resettlement program, 
the President-elect’s immigration proposals are cause for concern and are reminiscent of some of 
America’s darkest days.” AAI Issue Brief: Bigotry, ARAB AM. INST. (last visited Mar. 28, 2019), 
http://www.aaiusa.org/aai_issue_brief_bigotry. The American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee has 
submitted comments on proposed changes to the refugee program and has urged Congressional response 
to the Syrian refugee crisis and the needs of Palestinians, while standing in solidarity with other Latino 
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naturalization backlogs amount to voter suppression under the guise of 
unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud. The heads of the immigration 
bureaucracy refer to a breakdown of law and order. 
Some groups that protest discrete second wall policies do regularly 
entangle themselves in the immigration debate, and when they have turned 
to these issues they focus on exposing apparent pretexts. The American Civil 
Liberties Union waged a lawsuit challenging a new government practice of 
arresting noncitizens at their adjustment of status interviews, which the 
ACLU states is “subjecting noncitizens to detention and removal while they 
follow the government’s own regulations for obtaining lawful immigration 
status based on their marriages to U.S. citizens.”145 The ACLU has taken up 
lawsuits on behalf of military recruits impacted by the new intensified 
vetting policies and ever-increasing backlogs.146 For those adversely affected 
by these policies, resistance also takes the form of support networks, such as 
in the case of Hector Barajas-Varela, who founded the Deported Veterans 
Support House in Tijuana—an essential oasis for deported veterans.147 The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
Legal Defense and Education Fund and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
and Economic Justice have also challenged the administration’s decisions to 
rescind Temporary Protected Status for several countries as 
unconstitutionally discriminatory based on race.148 But their actions to 
oppose second wall policies are secondary to their advocacy surrounding the 
first wall. 
C. STYMIED BY SECOND WALL BARRIERS 
What is notable about the select challenges to the second wall is how 
they deviate from the comparatively more successful resistance to first wall 
immigration policies. They are top-down efforts, driven by elite lawyers and 
think tanks rather than bottom-up grass-roots advocacy. They are driven by 
issue experts, rather than by broad publics or the immigrants themselves. Of 
the handful of pro-immigrant actions bubbling up from communities, most 
are uncoordinated and hortatory in nature rather than commanding of public 
attention and legal response, excepting the state attorneys general and the 
ACLU litigation. For all of their subtlety, the singular intrusions on legal 
migration are not well understood. Many of the component policies, such as 
the updated guidelines are highly technical and it is not obvious how they 
are related to one another or to increased backlogs. They are easily dismissed 
as the byproduct of a poorly operating immigration bureaucracy, rather than 
a deliberate policy strategy. The singular intrusions on legal migration add 
up to a significant policy challenge to immigrants and an even larger 
challenge for democracy. Countering this threat to democracy, there needs to 
be a broader rethinking of how our immigration bureaucracy operates and is 
                                                                                                                 
immigrant rights and civil rights groups on general concerns for racial profiling and discrimination, 
cooperation between ICE and police, and protecting due process for immigrants in the removal process. 
145. See Jiminez v. Nielsen, No. 1:18-cv-10225-MLW, 2018 WL 910716 (D. Mass. Apr. 10, 2018). 
146. See Kuang v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 3:18CV03698 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019). 
147. Patrick J. McDonnell, A Home in Tijuana Is a Refuge for Deported U.S. Veterans, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-veterans-
2017-story.html. 
148. See, e.g., Centro Presente v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-10340 (D. Mass. May 9, 
2018); NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-239 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2018). 
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influenced by broader political mobilization and more pointed legal 
accountability.  
V. SCALING THE SECOND WALL 
This Essay has argued that, with the exception of a few still-developing 
efforts, the second wall response has been inadequate. Our prescriptions for 
more effectively resisting second wall policies can be arrayed by ambition: 
enhancing individual challenges, expanding political accountability through 
structural reform, and building public support through a sanctuary 
movement. 
A. ENHANCING INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGES 
Private attorneys must continue to act as a necessary check on 
government overreach and poor policy decisions. Private immigration 
attorneys have previously been and continuously are a check on the 
government in general and USCIS in particular. For example, when USCIS 
delays an application, attorneys can file a mandamus action in federal court 
requesting the court order USCIS to adjudicate the delayed petition either 
before an interview pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, or after an interview 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 149 Attorneys are also able to appeal the denial 
of an N-400 Application for Naturalization to an immigration officer using 
form N-336, Request for a Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization 
Proceedings, or, in cases where USCIS fails to render a decision within 120 
days of a naturalization interview, an attorney is able to bring suit in federal 
court under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Even if the individual case results are critical, 
widespread policy changes are unlikely to result from individual litigation 
without precedent-setting impact-litigation.  
The profile of private litigation can be amplified with legal actions that 
seek to tackle systemic barriers. Impact litigation from experienced 
immigrants’ rights organizations is vital. So are the state-sponsored litigation 
campaigns of state attorneys general. Already groups such as the ACLU are 
challenging the soundness of many second wall policies though large-scale 
impact litigation, but this opposition effort must continue and expand. The 
ability to affect policy through private litigation will continue to be necessary 
to deconstruct the second wall, and moving to impact litigation strategies 
raises the stakes and publicity.  
Another enhancement to private litigation is the involvement of states. 
State and local governments are increasingly pushing back against 
restrictionist immigration policies in a manner that resembles the 
infrastructure of first wall sanctuary movements. Recently state and localities 
have inquired into federal practices that hurt immigrants within their 
communities. For example, a letter was signed by mayors of thirty major 
cities concerned about the naturalization backlog. Their opposition to these 
federal policies is largely hortatory, but they gained attention when a FOIA 
                                                                                                                 
149. Federal courts can either (1) conduct a hearing and adjudicate the naturalization application 
or (2) remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the service to determine. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) 
(1991). 
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lawsuit was filed demanding an explanation of agency practices,150 and a 
Colorado State Advisory Committee hearing for the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights was conducted to further investigate.151 Though their efforts 
pale in comparison to the high-profile lawsuits against the first wall travel 
ban and sanctuary cities executive order, they are gaining significance. 
Twenty-four attorneys general wrote to the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security in opposition to the changing public charge rule.152 More 
lawsuits are expected as the rule is increasingly implemented, including 
lawsuits related to USCIS’s compliance with the strict requirements of the 
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.153 State and local governments opposed to 
increasingly restrictionist policies have also been updating laws and policies 
related to immigration as a general matter, limiting information sharing and 
updating guidelines to enhance immigrants’ rights on a range of issues. 
While promising, these state attorneys generals’ and mayors’ actions remain 
exceptional in the effort to scale the second wall and secondary to the groups 
themselves.  
B. EXPANDING POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH STRUCTURAL 
REFORM 
Recognizing that immigration policies and procedures are in a state of 
dysfunction that require fixes that surpasses the capacity of individual 
challenges, the structure of policymaking needs to be reformed. This requires 
changes to the funding, policies, and practices of the immigration 
bureaucracy, as well as revisiting judicial and Congressional oversight. 
1. Increased Resources for Administering Immigration Benefits  
Initially, in order to increase the ability for USCIS to adjudicate 
applications quickly and efficiently, thus reducing or eliminating some of the 
massive backlogs that have built up over the last two years, an increase in 
USCIS’s budget is necessary. While USCIS has a unique funding structure 
that rests 95% of its operations budget on user fees rather than relying on 
Congressional appropriations,154 there have been calls to supplement the 
user-fees with Congressional appropriations.155 Indeed, there is no indication 
that this user-based fee structure was meant to ensure USCIS’ independence 
                                                                                                                 
150. Letter from Thirty U.S. Mayors to USCIS (Nov. 10, 2016) (urging Congress to appropriate 
funds to reduce the naturalization backlog). 
151. Press Release, Colorado Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to 
Examine Backlog in Citizenship and Naturalization Applications (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://www.usccr.gov/press/2019/02-08-PR.pdf. As a matter of disclosure, one of the authors is a 
member of the Colorado Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and participated 
in this hearing. 
152. Letter from 24 Attorneys General to Samantha Deshommes, Chief, Regulatory Coordination 
Div. Office of Pol’y and Strategy (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nmag.gov/uploads/PressRelease/ 
48737699ae174b30ac51a7eb286e661f/AG_Balderas_Leads_Coalition_of_24_Attorneys_General_Dem
anding_President_Trump_and_ICE_Stop_Illegal_Rule_that_Would_Harm_Immigrant_Families.pdf 
(demanding President Trump and ICE stop an illegal rule that would harm immigrant families).  
153. Evan Weinberger, Trump Immigration Proposal Could Face Credit Reporting Challenge, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 28, 2018; 2:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/trump-
immigration-proposal-could-face-credit-reporting-challenge. 
154. KANDEL, supra note 4. 
155. Letter from U.S. House of Representatives to Francis Cissna, Dir., USCIS (June 29, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/N-400_processing_times_-
_Representative_Lofgren.pdf. 
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from Congressional oversight, and so appropriations from Congress may 
serve the additional purpose of subjecting USCIS to additional institutional 
checks. Moreover, in order to limit the ability of USCIS to use these funds, 
or the funds that applicants pay, on enforcement operations, any increase in 
budget must be accompanied by specific limitations on the budget used for 
enforcement efforts. Indeed as one Congressional oversight letter noted, 
USCIS has mysteriously requested that some of its funding be reallocated to 
ICE enforcement operations while it is struggling to meet its own targets for 
reducing backlogs. Under the President’s proposed budget for Fiscal Year 
2019, over $200 million would be transferred from USCIS’ user-funded 
account to ICE for enforcement operations.156 In order to reduce mission drift 
and allow USCIS to refocus itself on effectively and efficiently adjudicating 
immigration benefit petitions, this practice must not continue. 
Relatedly, USCIS must use funding to hire additional attorneys and staff 
for the purpose of serving legal immigrants.157 Beyond increasing funds, the 
funds must be earmarked or guided toward mission-enhancing purposes.158 
The expanding and sometimes conflicting priorities of the agency to serve 
immigrants and police fraud or national security concerns dilute the available 
resources for service to immigrants, communication with immigration 
attorneys, and benefit adjudications. Agency leadership differs in deciding 
how much centralized control to exert over the allocation of resources within 
an agency, as opposed to granting localized discretion. As a legal matter, 
agencies are typically given considerable latitude over such decisions, and 
there are signs that they are exercising that discretion in favor of immigration 
enforcement rather than service. Moreover, presidents and their political 
appointees have the right to appoint leaders who are responsive to changing 
policy priorities who in turn influence civil servant staff. Still, there are 
limitations on this political influence given Congress’ setting of the statutory 
mission of the agency and constraints imposed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act on agency policymaking. Congress’ letter to USCIS 
Ombudsman Julie Kirchner suggests that there has been inadequate restraint 
on the politicization of the agency.159 
2.  Streamlining Procedural Burdens 
Improving operations in an agency requires continual rethinking of 
organizational procedures. Evidence of lapses in the accuracy of immigration 
benefit adjudication necessitates such reforms. However, increasing 
                                                                                                                 
156. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf. 
157. Jason A. Cade, Sanctuary as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration 
Enforcement, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433 (2018) (arguing fees lead to allocating more resources in the U visa 
program to promptly adjudicate EAD requests). Cade also explores funding solutions like crowd sourced 
platforms, state victims assistance funds, and philanthropic measures. 
158. Amanda Frost, Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2017) 
(arguing where legalization or adjustment is possible it is a preferred way of reducing the scope and size 
of enforcement). 
159. Amanda Holpuch, How Trump’s ‘Invisible Wall’ Policies Have Already Curbed Immigration, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/15/invisible-wall-
trump-policies-have-curbed-immigration (“At least six current and former advisers to Donald Trump, 
including Kellyanne Conway and Stephen Miller, have ties to FAIR, which for decades has been working 
to drastically curb immigration.”); Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Members, 
supra note 140. 
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procedures imposes costs on the agency and the immigrants seeking benefits 
in the form of time, money, hassle, and negative dispositions on immigration 
benefits. Careful consideration should be given to whether the costs are 
justified by the improvements to agency operations and outcomes. 
For instance, in the context of new policies related to expedited denials 
in the context of requests for evidence, administrative efficiency is being 
prioritized over the potential for erroneous denials of applications for 
qualifying immigrants. New procedures for issuing notices to appear allow 
USCIS to entangle itself with ICE and the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR), focusing on combating fraud and increased enforcement at 
the cost of administrative efficiency and independence. New procedures for 
calculating unlawful presence seem to stem from the agency’s focus on 
maintaining the integrity of the immigration system to the exclusion of any 
sort of process. However, the priorities inherent in these kinds of decisions 
must be examined closely. USCIS must be mindful of the collateral 
consequences these new procedural burdens possess, both for the immigrant 
and the agency. Increased scrutiny of applications results in longer 
processing times, which in turn leads to further increases in crisis-level 
backlogs. Policies aimed at increasing the enforcement power of USCIS 
conflict directly with the service-minded, customer service approach of years 
past. 
3.  Restructured Substantive Priorities 
Relatedly, USCIS must re-evaluate its substantive priorities and 
rebalance the necessity of protecting national security and ensuring the 
effective enforcement of the country’s immigration laws with the collateral 
effects increased enforcement policies have on lawful immigrants and 
would-be citizens. The goals of USCIS must be re-evaluated to reflect the 
institution’s policy objectives against the practical consequences of many of 
its new policies. USCIS must not lose sight of its Congressional mandate and 
be swept up in the influence of restrictionist rhetoric and policies.  
Little evidence has been furnished about the need for increased scrutiny 
in many of the categories where procedures have been enhanced. No 
explanation has been given for why initial determinations no longer require 
deference in subsequent agency dispositions. New requirements for 
interviews in the adjudication of high-skilled employment visas have led to 
backlogs and increased denial rates without evidence that the additional steps 
are necessary. There is a lack of information about the presence of national 
security risks within the military or from countries of special interest 
designated under the CARRP program. There has been no proof of alleged 
welfare fraud, voting fraud, immigration benefit fraud, or other harms to 
American workers and taxpayers. In the absence of such evidence, it is 
unclear whether corresponding backlogs and increased denial rates for 
service members and predominantly Muslim immigrants are justified.  
There are valid reasons to take seriously national security threats. But it 
must be done in a more transparent and fair manner. Additional evidentiary 
requirements must be required before subjecting military service members, 
refugees, and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries to heightened 
scrutiny. Having higher evidentiary burdens serve as a bulwark against 
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pretextual findings or racial stereotyping, an issue of concern in cases that 
fall under CARRP, as applicants who may only have lived in an area with 
high terrorist activity, or who may have a former roommate who has been 
classified as a national security threat may find themselves in legal limbo 
with no recourse. It will also permit the agency to better discover and 
prioritize actual security risks. Vetting for refugees and military service is 
already strong. It is not clear why further vetting is needed, and new risks to 
the safety of service members and refugees are introduced while they await 
the adjudication of their benefits. That is not to say there is not a need to 
thoroughly investigate national security threats, but these investigations must 
not be merely pretext to implement policies meant only to restrict legal 
migration. Further, such new policies must not be immunized from judicial 
review by couching substantive changes in procedural language. Changes to 
substantive priorities must be done transparently, allowing independent 
review of the decision making process. National security threats must be 
pursued in a manner that respects due process and balances the risks to 
security with risks to other Constitutional values and the rule of law.  
In the same way, sweeping changes to prioritize immigrants of merit 
must be done thoughtfully, if done at all. The self-sufficiency of immigrants, 
the viability of the welfare state, and the soundness of tax dollars are 
important to the United States and important to the immigrants who come 
here. Still, there are problems associated with broadening definitions of 
public charge in a manner that unfairly penalizes immigrants for utilizing 
public benefits to which they are lawfully entitled, especially if it is to an 
extent that endangers the health and welfare of immigrants and to society in 
general. Fraudulent use of public benefits is a fair target for investigation, 
but little evidence of that fraud exists and, indeed, many immigrants are 
already not entitled to use public benefits. The dangers of potential public 
charges must not be overblown, nor the benefits of a heightened public 
charge standard inflated. There are real consequences to this new policy that 
appear to far exceed any benefits received and dangers countered by it. 
Protecting American workers is an important policy goal, and it is one 
instantiated in immigration law. The safety of U.S. workers can and should 
be prioritized over temporary foreign workers. Still, myopic policies that 
erect unnecessary hurdles or unreasonably restrict the types of workers that 
may enter the U.S. serve only to harm U.S. companies and, by extension, the 
U.S. economy. Uncovering fraud and combating abuse are valid goals, but 
new policies must be thoughtfully executed so as to not create more backlogs 
and inefficiencies. 
4.  Increased Institutional Independence and Fidelity to Agency Mission 
Finally, USCIS has started to shift away from its original mission of 
integration under the Trump administration. In order to maintain the integrity 
of the immigration system, USCIS must adhere to its mission of integration 
rather than continuing its mission drift towards another enforcement branch 
of the Department of Homeland Security. 
To this end, the reasoning behind policy decisions must be established to 
determine if there is evidence of political motives as pretext for these policy 
changes. This administration’s first claims regarding immigration included 
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decrying the massive amounts of voter fraud from undocumented individuals 
in the 2016 election.160 This led to the creation of a voting integrity 
commission that, after providing an extremely flawed report that 
demonstrated no voter fraud, was quietly disbanded.161 In the present 
scenario, a Congressional investigation could shed light on whether the 
alleged fraud that forms the impetus behind many of these policy changes 
actually exists, or are merely political motives in disguise. Additional 
transparency from USCIS is also needed at a time when internal operations 
and policy decisions are leading to massive backlogs, delays, and facially 
restrictionist policies. Courts have taken the position that there are limits on 
politically-motivated policies in litigation against the rescission of Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA), Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 
and non-immigration programs that have been found arbitrary and 
capricious. Similar principles ought to animate the evaluation of changes in 
legal migration.  
Finally, USCIS must ensure its fidelity to its statutory mission. While it 
is a component of the Department of Homeland Security and has 
responsibilities for ensuring the integrity of immigration law, it has a service 
mission that is distinct from ICE and CBP. There must be differentiation of 
USCIS from ICE within the Department of Homeland Security itself, and 
institutional independence between USCIS and EOIR, which were 
intentionally separated after the Department of Homeland Security was 
reorganized in 2003. By keeping appropriate distance, USCIS may cleanly 
stay in its delineated role as the adjudicator of immigration applications, and 
not as the enforcer of immigration laws. By keeping its independence from 
the EOIR, USCIS will further insulate itself from the enforcement branch of 
the Department of Homeland Security while simultaneously helping protect 
the independence of the immigration courts.  
Additionally, USCIS can support immigration attorneys and community 
organizations that provide valuable assistance to immigrants with the 
immigration process. Many of these organizations already receive part of 
their funding from USCIS, and use this funding to provide such services as 
naturalization drives and free or low cost legal assistance. USCIS should 
continue to provide such funding and expand rather than retract its support 
for immigration attorneys and these community groups with the execution 
of its service mission. 
C. BUILDING A SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 
In normal times, institutional checks on abuse within the immigration 
system would come from within the agency, from Congress, or from intra-
agency watchdogs. Problematic policies would be challenged in court by 
individual or impact litigation. But these are exceptional times. The 
traditional overseers and watchmen, are vacating their responsibilities, and 
Congress, through inaction, has been complicit or quiescent as the second 
wall has been constructed. Where the traditional fire alarms would sound 
there is public silence or muted efforts of individual attorneys. 
                                                                                                                 
160. See Marina Villeneuve, Report: Trump Commission Did Not Find Widespread Voter Fraud, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 3, 2018), https://apnews.com/f5f6a73b2af546ee97816bb35e82c18d. 
161. Id. 
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In order to overcome these structural obstacles, public opposition must 
be mobilized. Communities with immigrants must be energized and 
invigorated. Public opposition to second wall policies will be critical to 
limiting their application and ending their practice. Large scale organizing 
and grassroots mobilization are imperative in light of the relative lack of 
political power of those affected by second wall policies. Experts such as the 
NPNA have rallied opposition to the immense naturalization backlog, both 
by filing a lawsuit over the causes of the naturalization backlog, and by 
organizing in a more traditional sense, even acquiring the support of fifty 
mayors of major cities in their efforts to reduce the backlog and delayed 
adjudications.162 Policy briefs from AILA have shed light on the recent 
failings of USCIS, and sparked Congressional interest in the topic. However, 
groups that are resisting these second wall policies must be more connected. 
Newcomers to immigration law must be connected with established 
networks who have the capacity to confront the invisibility and complexity 
of the second wall. Coming together will allow the groups to move beyond 
opposing individual policies that harm their constituencies in order to more 
effectively tackle the second wall as an overarching construct. 
Public pressure will also enhance accountability by allowing 
government entities to further investigate the policies that comprise the 
second wall. Already the Colorado Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) is holding public hearings to 
investigate the causes and consequences of the naturalization backlog. The 
findings it makes about what policies contribute to the backlog and how the 
backlog impacts civil rights, voting rights, and the fair administration of 
justice could trigger further evaluation of USCIS’ practices toward legal 
immigrants. With public exposure, Congress may hold public hearings to 
investigate the rationale for these policies and explore solutions. The 
information collected through these investigations will assist policy makers, 
community groups, and private attorneys alike to scale the second wall.  
Understanding that politicians are accountable to their constituencies, 
political organizing around immigration policies will be important in 
upcoming elections. Without the right to vote, immigrants lack the political 
power of many other groups. This makes it imperative that advocacy groups 
and individuals join together in placing emphasis on second wall policies 
when engaging with elected or campaigning officials. That Congress has the 
power to check second wall policies has become easier to see with the change 
in political control over the House that has enabled Congress to begin to 
utilize some of its oversight authority. 
While complex policies and obfuscated practices make scaling the 
second wall a challenge, mobilizing can bring visibility to the policies and 
translate that seeming disparate policies into social problems that can be 
redressed. In this way, second wall policies will be able to tap into the 
organizing surrounding first wall practices. Immigration policies have 
concrete and rippling effects for society. It is imperative that groups be 
equipped to challenge second wall policies by bridging the gap between the 
first wall and second wall response.  
                                                                                                                 
162. See Letter from U.S. Mayors, supra note 132. 
Chen Book Proof (Do Not Delete) 8/15/2019 5:39 PM 
586 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 28:549 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The legal effects of the second wall prompt Constitutional and statutory 
violations, procedural deprivations, and tangible suffering in the form of 
denied benefits, intense anxiety, and feelings of exclusion. Being unfairly 
judged a national security threat due to being from a Muslim majority 
country or refugee leads to social exclusion, unlawful discrimination, and 
disregard for the contributions of immigrants and military service members 
who serve the U.S. Being unable to obtain a green card due to procedural 
hurdles impedes the possibility of immigrants permanently settling in the 
U.S. Being long delayed from naturalizing impedes the possibility of 
immigrants becoming citizens who can participate fully in society. The 
barriers to integration and naturalization for legal immigrants are particularly 
problematic because, unlike visa applications and requests for voluntary 
waivers, the process for naturalization is provided for in the U.S. 
Constitution and is a right, not a privilege granted on a discretionary basis. 
Thus, the deprivations of these rights without a reasoned basis infringe on 
the command for Congress to provide a uniform rule of naturalization. Also, 
the unexplained delays and ever present exposure to the risk of removal or 
even denaturalization implicate due process and potentially violate the 
Administrative Procedure Act.163  
Beyond legal concerns, as a normative concern, jeopardizing legal 
immigration means abandoning the historical legacy of the U.S. as a nation 
of immigrants, committed to welcoming foreigners rather than excluding 
them and promoting equality among them rather than sending an 
exclusionary message. It also undermines the quality of citizenship.164 The 
threat of endangering legal permanent residence as a path to naturalized 
citizenship is that the meaning of citizenship becomes conditional on 
arbitrary criteria such as political loyalty, perceived Americanness, and racial 
and cultural prerequisites. Moreover, the fear of immigrants and their 
advocates of exposure to enforcement that accompanies seeking a benefit 
exacerbates the problem. They do not want to defend legal immigrants 
because focusing on legal immigrants deflects attention from more dire first 
wall policies at the border. These and other chilling effects stymie civic 
engagement and societal participation. Also, legal immigrants who have 
previously felt secure in their attempts to comply with the law are now afraid 
of being swept in to the dragnet and now lie low, preferring to hide in the 
shadows of a law that ironically ought to protect them rather than stand up 
and fight for inclusion in the way undocumented immigrants have been 
willing to do in the absence of alternatives. These changes cumulatively 
threaten the rule of law and respect for the immigration system, creating 
perverse incentives and sending negative messages to immigrants seeking to 
comply with the law and cooperate with the immigration bureaucracy.  
Second wall incursions also come at the cost of democratic values and 
institutional integrity. As a matter of institutional integrity, these expanded 
                                                                                                                 
163. Cf. Solis v. Cissna, Civil Action 9:18-cv-00083 (D.S.C. filed Jan 09, 2018) (delay in VAWA 
did not violate APA or due process because it is discretionary). 
164. Masha Gessen, Trump’s New War on Immigrants, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2018) (“The 
creation of the task force is undoing the naturalization of more than 20 million naturalized citizens in the 
American population by taking away their assumption of permanence.”). 
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enforcement operations contribute to mission drift and increased 
organizational dysfunction of USCIS by taking money from user fees 
intended for other more integrative purposes, a reappropriation that is 
potentially itself unlawful. The harms to immigrants from denying the 
benefits to which they are entitled have already been enumerated. These 
challenges to legal migration not only create a problem for immigrants, they 
foment civil rights problem for current and future U.S. citizens. Given that 
naturalization provides a right to vote, delays and denials of naturalization 
generate worrisome consequences for Latino racial and national origin 
minorities whose votes have been suppressed before. Enlisting the votes of 
newly-naturalized voters might be consequential, even if newly-naturalized 
immigrants do not necessarily vote as a block.165 Holding back integration 
for legal immigrants means either diluting societal participation or outright 
suppressing votes. This is especially true in states with large minority 
populations and contested political races.166  
Staying silent in the face of legal, normative, and societal threats is costly 
to immigrants and citizens alike. Scaling the second wall will require 
individual, structural, and public reforms that sound the alarms on the 
challenges of legal immigrants. 
                                                                                                                 
165. Asian Americans, the fastest-growing minority group with a foreign-born population, show 
generally progressive opinion across subethnic groups, with Filipino and Vietnamese voter exceptions. 
See CIV. LEADERSHIP USA, 2018 ASIAN AMERICAN VOTER SURVEY 21 (2018), http://www.apiavote.org/ 
sites/apiavote/files/2018-AA-Voter-Survey-report-Oct9_0.pdf. Latino voters vote overwhelming 
Democratic, as well. Polling of Latino voters indicates President Trump and his anti -immigrant 
policies have displaced the economy as their primary concern. According to the Pew Research 
Center, 75 percent of Latinos have discussed Trump’s anti-Latino behavior and policies with their 
friends and families, raising expectations they will vote on these issues in  upcoming elections. See 
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assets/sites/731/docs/Naturalization_and_Voting_Age_Population_web.pdf. 
